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FAMILY LAW: HUSBAND AND WIFE
by
Joseph W. McKnight*

I.

M

ARRIAGE

STATUS

LICENSE. Section 1.51 of the Family Code, with

some exceptions, forbids the county clerk from issuing a marriage
license to an applicant under eighteen years of age. 1 The Code
also provides, however, that a person who has been married has "the power
and capacity of an adult."' 2 The Attorney General has given an opinion that
the clerk may not issue a license to a person under eighteen, regardless of
that person's prior marital status.3 A person who has acquired adulthood
through marriage should not lose that status on divorce, particularly with
respect to contracting another marriage. Section 1.51 should, therefore, be
amended to rectify this oversight.
Informal Marriage. A federal court sitting in another jurisdiction considered the validity of a Texas informal marriage. 4 The parties as husband and
wife executed a deed to a house, in which conveyance they waived all their
homestead rights. The court held that this act was direct evidence of an
informal marriage, reasoning that the deed contained all the necessary elements of proof.5 First, execution as husband and wife indicated an agreement to be married. Second, sale of a house referred to as a homestead was
proof of cohabitation. Third, the deed itself was a representation to others
6
that the couple were husband and wife.
Section 1.91(b) of the Family Code provides that if cohabitation and holding out as husband and wife are proved, an agreement of the couple to be
married may be inferred. 7 This inference should not be entertained except
when no credible evidence exists of an agreement to be married or not to be
married; if testimony of an agreement is in evidence, the court should not
* B.A., The University of Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia
University. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ernest P. Metzger and Alberto Boada in the preparation of this article.
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.51 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
2. Id. § 4.03 (Vernon 1975).
3. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-359 (1985).
4. Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Wyo. 1985).
5. Id. at 1230. The necessary elements for an informal marriage are (1) an agreement
presently to become husband and wife, (2) a living together as such, and (3) a holding out of
each other as husband and wife. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(a)(2) (Vernon 1975).
6. 607 F. Supp. at 1230.

7. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1975); see Estate of Claveria v. Claveria,

615 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex. 1981).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

employ the inference but should make a finding on the basis of the evidence
presented. 8 In an instance when one of the parties testifies that no agreement to marry existed and the other party does not deny this, the first element seems clearly lacking. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals nevertheless
seems to have approved the trial court's inference in such a case. 9
Interspousal Testimony. Section 38.11 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
defines the martial-communication privilege by providing, with some exceptions, that neither spouse may testify against the other during the marriage. 10 An alleged spouse by informal marriage, however, is competent to
testify against an accused in Texas if the accused offers no evidence of the
informal marriage at trial. " The showing necessary to establish an informal
marriage in a criminal trial is substantially equivalent to that necessary in
the civil context. 12 In Brooks v. State1 3 the court of criminal appeals held
that the issue of the existence of an informal marriage between a defendant
and a witness was properly submitted to the jury. The defendant had appealed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony
of a woman he claimed as his common-law wife. Although the defendant
and the witness had lived together for six months, the witness gave conflicting testimony as to whether she considered herself to be the defendant's
wife. 14 The trial court allowed her to testify and instructed the jury to disregard the testimony if they found that an informal marriage existed. The
court of criminal appeals noted that the jury should be instructed not to
consider testimony only when the evidence clearly shows that an informal
marriage existed.' 5 Here the testimony itself presented a fact question as to
court held that the jury
the existence of the informal marriage.16 Hence the
17
was properly allowed to evaluate the testimony.
In January v. State'8 the trial court, after hearing testimony out of the
presence of the jury, held as a matter of law that the defendant and his
alleged spouse had not entered into a common-law marriage and thus allowed her to testify before the jury. The trial court, however, failed to instruct the jury on the elements of the marital-communication privilege
contained in section 38.11.19 The defendant raised the lack of instruction on
8. See McKnight, Family Law: Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw.
L.J. 115, 115 (1980); cf McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 97, 97-98 (1982).
9. See Carson v. Kee, 677 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 1984, no writ).
10. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
11. Salayandia v. State, 651 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet.
ref'd).
12. See Hightower v. State, 629 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Bodde v. State,
568 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
13. 686 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
14. The elements of an informal marriage are contained in TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91
(Vernon 1975) and are set forth supra note 5.
15. 686 S.W.2d at 954.
16. Id.

17. Id.
18. 678 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
19.

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.11 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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appeal. While acknowledging that in the event of conflicting evidence the
existence of an informal marriage is usually submitted to the jury, the
Corpus Christi court refused to address the defendant's contention because
his counsel did not submit a requested charge on common-law marriage and
did not object sufficiently to the trial court's charge. Although the defendant's counsel noted his displeasure with the court's handling of the commonlaw marriage issue,20 the court of appeals held that the defendant's objection
was not specific enough to inform the trial court of the nature of the comhe wished to have
plaint and that the defendant failed to tell the court that
21
the jury charged on the common-law marriage issue.
Alienation of Affection. In Greenway v. Greenway22 an ex-wife sued her husband's subsequent wife for alienation of affection. The trial court entered a
summary judgment for the defendant and the ex-wife appealed. The husband had made statements to his estranged wife that he was having an affair
with the defendant and that he wanted to marry her. The court of appeals
held that the husband's statements to his wife were admissible to show that
the husband's affections had been transferred from his wife to the defendant
before the husband and wife were divorced. 23 This evidence, considered
with the fact that the husband married the defendant one month after the
divorce, created a reasonable inference that the husband was involved with
the defendant prior to leaving his wife. 24 Thus, disputed facts were in issue,
25
and the court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
CriminalNonsupport. In Lowry v. State26 the court of criminal appeals ruled
that the affirmative defense provision of the criminal nonsupport statute27 is
unconstitutional under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 28 The offending provision made it an affirmative defense to criminal
nonsupport that the former spouse could not provide the support. 2 9 The
court held that requiring a defendant to disprove his ability to provide supelement of the
port shifted to the defendant the burden of disproving an
30
law.
of
process
due
of
principle
the
violating
thus
offense,
20. When asked by the trial court whether he had any particular objection, the defendant's counsel responded "only that of the common law." The trial court asked, "of what?"
and the response was, "on that common law marriage." 678 S.W.2d 246-47.
21. Id. at 247.
22. 693 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
23. Id. at 602.
24. Id.
25. Id. The court expressed some reservations about the affidavits that the ex-wife

presented in support of her action. The affidavits contained hearsay, conclusions, and material
not based on personal knowledge. Id. at 601. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
26. 692 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
27. The statute provides that "An individual commits an offense if he intentionally or
knowingly fails to provide support that he can provide and that he was legally obligated to
provide for his children younger than 18 years, or for his spouse who is in needy circumstances." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
28. 692 S.W.2d at 88; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05(0 (Vernon 1975).
30. 692 S.W.2d at 87. Since the state must prove the defendant's ability to provide support, requiring the defendant to prove his inability to provide support as an affirmative defense
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Loss of Consortium. Evidence of prior marital discord is properly admissible
by a defendant to rebut a loss-of-consortium claim. 3' In Pool v. Ford Motor
Co. 32 the husband sought damages for an alleged defective product that had
caused him injury, and his wife made a claim for loss of past and future
consortium due to her husband's injuries. The defendant responded with
evidence that the husband had filed suit for divorce and that the couple had
been and were presently separated. The trial court refused to admit the evidence and ultimately ordered remittitur of the damages for the loss-of-future-consortium claim. The Texarkana court held that the evidence offered
by the defendant directly responded to the plaintiff's proof of material elements of the loss-of-consortium claim (both past and future), 33 but that the
excluded evidence, if admitted, would not have resulted in unfair prejudice. 34 The Texas Supreme Court held that exclusion of the evidence was
harmless as to the loss of past consortium because evidence of estrangement
was before the jury. 35 The court also said that the evidence of contemplated
divorce would have been relevant to the loss of future consortium, but that
36
the recovery on that ground had been remitted.
A spouse's right to maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium arising from the other spouse's injuries is derivative of the tortfeasor's liability to
the injured spouse. 37 Thus, if the injured spouse's cause of action is barred
by the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 38 the complaining spouse's action
under the Act is also barred. 39 In Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin4° the Texas
Supreme Court held that the wife's common-law cause of action for intentional impairment of consortium was not barred by the Act because it does
not exempt employers from common-law liability for intentional injuries. 4 1
On an appeal after remand 42 a Houston court of appeals held that intent to
maintain an unsafe workplace could supply the necessary intent to support
the wife's claim and to avoid the bar imposed by the Workers' Compensation Act. 43 Intent to cause a particular consequence is not limited to those
results which the employer desires but may also include those which he
deprives him of due process. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
31. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 301, 305-06 (April 2, 1986), aff'g in part
and rev'g in part 688 S.W.2d 879 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985).
32. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 301 (April 2, 1986).
33. 688 S.W.2d at 882-83.
34. Id. at 883; see TEX. R. EvID. 403.
35. 29 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 305-06.

36. Id. at 306.
37. See Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 738-39 (Tex. 1980); Whittlesey v.
Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1978).
38. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3 (Vernon 1967).

39. Reed Tool Co., 610 S.W.2d at 739.
40. 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980).
41. See Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 108, 185 S.W. 556, 560

(1916).
42. Copelin v. Reed Tool Co., 679 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1984, no writ).
43. Id. at 608.
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knows are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act. 4 4 The employer is liable for the unintended consequences of his intentional invasion of
the employee's legally protected interest. 45 The court of appeals stated that
a finding by the jury that the employer maintained an unsafe workplace supthe
plied the intent necessary to maintain the wife's cause of action, and thus 46
trial court's grant of summary judgment for the employer was in error.
II.

CHARACTERIZATION

Community Presumption. In Whorrall v. WhorralI47 the Austin Court of
Appeals addressed the presumption of community ownership that arises
when real property is acquired during marriage. A couple purchased a
house two weeks after their marriage with contributions from each spouse's
separate funds. The husband subsequently filed for divorce and division of
the community estate and then appealed the trial court's finding that the
wife owned a separate interest in the house in proportion to her initial contribution toward the purchase. 48 First, the husband argued the presumption
49
that property acquired during marriage belongs to the community estate.
The court held that the wife satisfactorily rebutted this presumption,50 stating that a spouse may overcome this presumption by adequately and properly tracing the separate funds used in the purchase of the property 51 and
noting that the wife made a down payment on the house from funds that she
possessed before the marriage. 52 The husband then asserted that when title
to real property acquired during marriage is taken in the name of both
spouses, a presumption arises that one spouse intends to make a gift to the
other of one-half of his separate contribution.5 3 This presumption may be
overcome by evidence clearly showing an absence of donative intent.54 The
wife testified that she made the down payment from her separate funds with
the understanding that her husband would pay the remaining mortgage.
The court, therefore, concluded that the wife did not intend to make a gift of
one-half of the down payment. 55 Finally, the husband argued that when title
to property acquired during marriage is taken in the names of both husband
and wife, they presumptively agree that the property will belong to the com44. Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co., 670 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.-Austin
1984, no writ).
45. Id.

46. 679 S.W.2d at 608.
47. 691 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ dism'd).
48. This finding was based on the percentage of the purchase price that Mrs. Whorrall
contributed as a down payment. Id. at 34.
49. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975); see Brownlee v. Brownlee, 573 S.W.2d
878, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ); Poulter v. Poulter, 565 S.W.2d 107, 110
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1978, no writ).
50. 691 S.W.2d at 35.
51. Id. (citing McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973); Bilek v. Tupa,
549 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-

52.
53.
54.
55.

Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).

Id.
See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 168 (Tex. 1975).
Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d at 168.
691 S.W.2d at 35.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

munity. No such presumption exists, of course, in spite of some careless
dicta cited by the husband.5 6 Without commenting on the husband's argument, the appeals court stated that the conflicting testimony on the couple's
agreement as to ownership of the house presented a question of credibility
that should be left to the fact finder." 7 Thus, the court upheld the trial
court's characterization of the ownership interest in the house.58
In Kiel v. Brinkman59 the husband's parents, unable to pay the mortgage
on a house, conveyed the property to their married son with the understanding that the son would pay the mortgage and hold the parents harmless in
that regard. Upon the son's divorce the judgment did not dispose of the
property, and the son later sought an adjudication to quiet title to it. The exwife contended that the property was not a gift because the parents conveyed
it in consideration of the son's payment of the debt. The court ruled, however, that the ex-wife had made no showing that the parents intended to
convey the land specifically in exchange for their son's assumption of the
debt and concluded that the land was the son's separate property. 60 The
result seems clearly contrary to an objective analysis of the transaction. The
parents may have made a gift of their equity in the house, but the assumption of the mortgage along with the son's agreement to exonerate his parents
from liability constituted a community purchase.
The ex-husband in Taylor v. Taylor 6' appealed the finding that certain real
property was characterized as the ex-wife's separate property, when the exwife bought the property with income distributions from a trust for her benefit created by her parents. The trust corpus consisted of a ladies' dress
shop, and the trust agreement provided that the trustee had discretion to
retain the income and profits of the store for expansion of the business. The
court, therefore, held that the income and profits from the store were "not
only a part of the corpus of the trust estate, but were the principal assets of
the trust."' 62 Thus, the accumulated income distributed from the trust to the
wife was her separate property, as was the property that she purchased with
63
the distributions.
Tracing and Commingling. In Cook v. Cook 64 the wife at the inception of
the marriage owned a house and a car. She exchanged the house in the
purchase of the parties' homestead and traded the car in buying a pickup
truck. The court concluded that since her separate property amounted to
56. See Gonzalez v. Guajardo de Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1976, no writ); Robbins v. Robbins, 519 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975,

no writ).
57. 691 S.W.2d at 36; see Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792, 796-97 (Tex. 1951).
58. Id.
59. 668 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
60. Id. at 929-30. The trial court found that the husband in part had used community
earnings to pay off a loan of money used to discharge the debt on the property. Id. at 928. The

court did not address the issue of reimbursement for the community contribution.
61.

680 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

62. Id. at 649.
63. Id. at 650.
64. 679 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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forty-three percent of the purchase price of the home and twenty-eight percent of the purchase price of the truck, on dissolution of the marriage she
should receive as separate property the same percentage of the items
purchased. 65 Holding that much of the property had been mischaracterized
as community, the appellate court found an unjustified unequal division of
and reversed and remanded for a redivision of the marital
the property
66
estate.
The presumption under section 5.02 of the Family Code that all property
on hand at the dissolution of marriage is community property 67 may be re68
butted by tracing and clearly identifying the property claimed as separate.
Smith v. Smith 69 was a dispute as to the deceased husband's estate. Prior to
his death the husband had sold all his separate property and deposited the
proceeds into an account that contained community funds. The court held
that by establishing the sales price of the separate property the claimants did
not trace it when the proceeds were not on hand in a commingled or segregated account; thus, the presumption of community ownership was controlling. 70

This was a case in which the plaintiffs should have made an

alternative claim for reimbursement. Contrary to the usually expressed
view, maintenance of a balance of the amount of the claimed reimbursement
in an account from which reimbursement is claimed should be irrelevant to
such a claim. Reimbursement is not a tracing operation but establishment of
a debt. Hence, the status of a fund into which reimbursable funds have been
placed is beside the point.
InterspousalPartitions. In instances when ambiguity exists as to their intention to partition their property, spouses' efforts to produce a joint tenancy
from community property have encountered pronounced judicial resistance, 7 1 and the apparent hostility of the courts to the notion of creating a
joint tenancy by partitioning community property seems generally unwarranted. 72 Judicial reluctance to recognize the process has been motivated in
65. Id. at 583-84. The court refused to consider improperly introduced evidence of a
community interest in a profit-sharing account. Id. at 584.
66. Id. at 585-86.
67. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.02 (Vernon 1975).
68. See McKinley v. McKinley, 496 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tex. 1973).
69. 694 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, writ retd n.r.e.).
70. Id. at 433. A finding that property was once separate and a valuation of that property

does not accomplish a proper tracing and identification. See id. The claimants did not plead or
argue for reimbursement.
71. See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 693-95 (Tex. 1981); Williams v. McKnight,
402 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966); Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 574, 342 S.W.2d 565, 568
(1961).
72. A large part of the confusion surrounding interspousal partitions stems from the unusual set of facts that first presented the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. In Hilley v. Hilley,
161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961), the spouses directed a broker to purchase shares of stock
with community funds. The husband further instructed the broker that the stock certificates
should be issued in the spouses' names as joint tenants. There was no suggestion that either
spouse intended to make a gift to the other. Although a long-standing rule precluded spouses
from changing the character of community property to separate property by mere agreement,
the Texas Constitution had been amended in 1948 to allow partition of community property to
create separate property of each. The Hilleys, however, had not stated that they were entering
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some degree by a concern that spouses may unwittingly forfeit community
property rights in an attempt to achieve a right of survivorship. 73 The Texas
parties to
Supreme Court has, therefore, required that the intention of the
74
enter into a partition of community property be made explicit.
In the most recent instance, the San Antonio court showed excessive
resistance to the spouses' efforts to create joint tenancies with apparent aid of
their bankers. Over the years 1974 to 1981 the husband and wife in Jameson
v. Bain7 5 had deposited community funds into several joint accounts with
the right of survivorship. For four of the accounts, which were opened during the years 1974 to 1978, the spouses signed a partition agreement on the
back of the account card after executing a joint tenancy agreement with respect to each account. For accounts that were opened in 1981 the parties
executed a joint tenancy agreement but did not sign a partition agreement.
When the husband died, the wife withdrew the funds from all of the accounts and claimed them as her separate property. The executor of the husband's estate then brought suit for a declaration that all funds were
community property, and the trial court so found. 7 6 On the wife's appeal the
San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a joint tenancy had not been created
in any of the accounts because a partition of the community funds was not
accomplished prior to the joint tenancy agreement. 77 In this respect the

court followed Williams v. McKnight,78 in which the supreme court in 1966

into a partition, although the intention could have been easily inferred. Although the court
was prepared to assume that the instructions given to the broker in the presence of both
spouses and the issuance and acceptance of the certificates met the requirement for a written
survivorship agreement, the majority of the court was not willing to allow the extinction of the
community property and its transmutation into a species of separate property by mere inference. See id. at 574-75, 342 S.W.2d at 568.
73. See Maple v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981). Whether the courts should
countenance such agreements when both spouses probably do not appreciate all the legal consequences of their act is a legitimate question to ask, because a joint tenancy created by a
partition of community property is a species of separate property. By their partition the
spouses lose all the rights that community ownership entails. First, the creditors of either
spouse can probably reach only half of joint tenancy property, although some jurisdictions
would not allow any of it to be reached except by joint creditors of both spouses. Second, the
right of survivorship inherent in the joint tenancy excludes testamentary disposition by either
spouse and also precludes the first decedent's heirs from taking by intestacy. Third, because a
joint tenancy is a species of separate property, it cannot be divided other than equally on
divorce. Fourth, the parties cannot reconvert separate property into community property.
Although these are valid concerns, this is only one of thousands of instances when citizens do
not, and cannot, appreciate all the legal ramifications of their acts. Moreover, requiring
spouses to make an explicit partition before creating a joint tenancy will not supply this knowledge. See generally Report of Comm. on Estate Planning and Drafting: Inter Vivos Transfers
and Property Ownership, Probate and Trust Division, Severing Joint Property Interests, 16
REAL PROP. & TR. J. 435, 441-46 (1981).
74. See Maples v. Nimitz, 615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981); Williams v. McKnight, 402
S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. 1966). In Williams the court went a step further to say that community
property must be transmuted into separate property prior to making the joint tenancy agreement, 402 S.W.2d at 507. The court said that this process was required by Hilley, which did
not so state.
75. 693 SW.2d 676 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
76. Id. at 678.
77. Id. at 679.
78. 402 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1966).
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stated that Hilley v. Hilley79 had already laid down the rule of prior partition
in 1961. Hilley, however, pronounced no such rule,80 and nothing in the
constitution or statutes supports or ever supported such a conclusion.
Although the court reiterated this unjustified assertion in Maples v. Nimitz,8 '
the supreme court there alluded to the constitutional amendment8 2of 1980 in
a way that indicated that the whole issue might be reexamined.
Just how the Texas Supreme Court arrived at its apparent conclusion that
only explicit partitions are valid is difficult to perceive. In any dispute in
which one of the spouses has died and only the survivor is available to testify, the admissible evidence of mutual intent is almost inevitably very limited. But if two people have entered into a survivorship agreement, the trierof-fact should reasonably exercise some inference as to their intent toward
achieving the stated objective. Somewhat imprecisely, but nonetheless
clearly, the legislature has sought to supply this element of proof through a
series of statutes amending the Probate Code and the Savings and Loan
Act.8 3 Because these statutory efforts have not satisfied the courts, the constitution should perhaps be amended to provide specifically for the creation
of a right of survivorship in community property.
As to the pre-1980 accounts in Jameson the San Antonio court not only
held that the first-executed joint tenancy agreements were ineffective but also
that the partition agreements were invalid. Even if spouses fail to create a
joint tenancy by not completing a partition first, there is no reason why the
partition itself does not convert the community property into separate property. In the case of the 1981 accounts, the spouses merely agreed to create
joint tenancies of their community property and neglected to make an explicit partition. Under the more permissive spirit of the 1980 constitutional
amendment, however, an agreement to create a joint tenancy should be upheld if an intention to partition can be properly inferred from the spouses'
object of achieving survivorship.8 4 The principal stumbling block seems to
be the two-step procedure laid down in Williams v. McKnight,s5 which was
decided in 1966 before any part of the Family Code was enacted and before
the constitution was amended. The underlying law and the changing conditions of society require a new approach to the entire problem. The law need
not impede spouses from creating joint tenancies from their community
property absent a prima facie showing of fraud demanding a close scrutiny
of their apparent intent.
79.
80.
not that
81.

161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
The court merely said in Hilley that a proper partition could be achieved in that way,
partitions were required to be made in that way. See id. at 579, 342 S.W.2d at 571.
615 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Tex. 1981).

82. See id. at 694-95.
83. For the most recent amendment see Act of June 8, 1981, ch. 319, §§ 1-2, 1981 Tex.
Gen. Laws 895, 895-96.
84. See TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46(b) (Vernon Supp.
1986). The law was amended to enable spouses and those intending to marry to deal effectively with the character of their future acquisitions. Although in Jameson the court did not
discuss the issue of whether the amendment eliminates the requirement of a prior partition, the
court expressly rejected the proposition. 693 S.W.2d at 679.
85. 402 S.W.2d at 508.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

JointAccounts. Defining the incidents of mere joint accounts requires examination of the particular terms of their institution. Establishment of a joint
86
account does not in and of itself give rise to a survivorship agreement.
Chapter XI of the Probate Code sets forth the requirements for creating a
right of survivorship.8 7 There must be a written agreement, signed by the
decedent, that makes his interest survive to the other party. 88 The dece89
dent's intent is controlling and must be ascertained from the agreement.
In addition, the account must be made to survive to the remaining party by
the terms of the agreement. 90 Although no specific language is required for
creating a right of survivorship, the courts have held that the agreement
must vest ownership in the surviving party if the agreement creates a joint
tenancy. 9 1 A mere right of survivorship can be the consequences of a thirdparty beneficiary contract.
Retirement Benefits. Whorrall v. Whorral192 in part involved the disposition
of a special payment that a former employer conferred upon the husband at
retirement. To qualify as a community interest such a payment must be an
earned property right or based upon prior service during marriage. 93 The
husband insisted that the payment was a supplementary retirement benefit
based upon prior service to his employer. He did not urge that the payment
was a gratuity. He argued only that the portion of the payment earned during marriage belonged to the community. A personnel manager for the husband's employer testified that the husband's productivity had declined in
recent years and that company management wished to terminate his position. The manager also testified that the husband appeared willing to retire
upon receiving the special payment. The court concluded from this testimony that the employer offered the payment to the husband as an incentive
to retire from his unproductive position. 94 Further testimony established
that this type of payment was purely discretionary and was not made on an
employee-wide scale. The court concluded that the payment did not qualify
95
as a retirement benefit and thus was entirely community property.
86. Chopin v. InterFirst Bank Dallas, 694 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
87. Id. at 83.
88. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon 1980).
89. Extrinsic evidence may not be admitted to prove the decedent's intent. Sheffield v.
Estate of Dozier, 643 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. Chopin, 694 S.W.2d at 84.
91. See Krueger v. Williams, 163 Tex. 545, 551, 359 S.W.2d 48, 51-52 (1962) ("payable to
the survivor" does not vest ownership); Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref d n.r.e.) (checking account with the language "or to the survivor"
held insufficient to create survivorship right).
92. 691 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ dism'd).
93. See Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. 1976) (payment represented deferred compensation earned during each month of employment); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d
551, 554 (Tex. 1970) (payment on earned property right accrued over years of employment).
94. 691 S.W.2d at 38.
95. Id. Failure to report the payment on the proper retirement-withholding form operated as further proof that the payment was not a retirement benefit. Id.
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In Hardin v. Hardin96 the court characterized a trust set up by the Texas
Dental Association as the husband's separate property because the trust constituted a gift. 9 7 The husband had been a consulting attorney to the Association for thirty-three years. After he retired, as an expression of its
appreciation, the Association set up a trust for him from which he was allowed to receive payments for five years. The court reasoned that payment
of benefits under the trust secured no benefit to the employer because the
attorney had already retired at the time of the creation of the trust.98 The
benefits, therefore, constituted a gift.99

The husband in Vines v. Vines'0° contended on divorce that since his military retirement benefits vested upon his retirement in 1970, the benefits were
deemed to be separate property under McCarty v. McCarty.10 ' That case
can be interpreted as holding that the Court intended military benefits to be
a species of gratuity to military personnel. 10 2 The court, however, interpreted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA) 10 3 as a reversal of McCarty and affirmed the trial court's award of
4
thirty percent of the military pension to the wife.'0
Life Insurance Proceeds. When the surviving spouse is named as beneficiary
of a policy on a spouse's life, Texas courts have long treated the designation
as a gift to the beneficiary and thus an exception to the general rule that
proceeds of life insurance purchased with community funds are community
property. 0 5 In Dent v. Dent 10 6 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals refused to
extend the exception to proceeds of a community policy on the life of a third
person although the policy named one of the spouses as beneficiary. 10 7 In
Dent an insurance policy on the life of the husband's father was purchased
during the marriage with community funds. The father died prior to the
couple's divorce leaving the husband as beneficiary. On appeal the wife contested the divorce court's characterization of the proceeds as the husband's
separate property. The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision,
thus denying the husband's claim to the proceeds as his separate property.
The trial court's holding would have amounted to approval of self-dealing on
96. 681 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
97. Id. at 243.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court further noted that although other retirement benefits paid to the husband were community property, the divorce court had discretion to award those benefits to the
person who earned them. Id.
100. 683 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
101. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
102. See McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw.
L.J. 97, 109-10 (1982). For discussion of McCarty see infra notes 410-21 and accompanying
text.
103. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982). The USFSPA allows a court to treat pension benefits either
as separate or community, depending on state law. See id. § 1408(c).
104. 683 S.W.2d at 118.
105. See Brown v. Lee, 371 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1963).
106. 689 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
107. Id. at 522.
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the part of the husband who contracted for the policy. 1° 8
III.

MANAGEMENT AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY

Disposition of Jointly-Managed Community Property. In Dalton v. Don J.
Jackson, Inc. 109 the Austin Court of Appeals held that a husband may not
make a unilateral conveyance of his one-half interest in jointly-managed
community property. A husband and wife signed an exclusive listing agreement with a real estate agent to sell community property subject to their
joint management. A buyer submitted an offer to the agent and the husband
accepted in writing. The wife died before signing the contract. When the
husband refused to close the sale, the buyer sought specific performance of

the contract to sell the entire property. The trial court ordered conveyance
of the husband's one-half interest in the realty. On appeal the husband argued that section 5.22(c) of the Family Code forbids, as a unilateral partition, the sale of jointly-managed community property without joinder of
both spouses."I 0 In holding for the husband the court of appeals rejected the
buyer's assertion that disposition of the case was controlled by Williams v.
Portland State Bank.I' In Williams the Texarkana court relied upon section 5.22(c) in holding that a husband, in executing a deed of trust to jointlymanaged community property without joinder of his wife, created a valid
lien upon his one-half interest in the property. 1 2 The Austin court noted
that Williams had been criticized for subjecting community property to several, rather than joint, disposition and thus for allowing one spouse to
achieve an involuntary partition of a community asset. 1 3 The court, therefore, concluded that the holding in Williams was contrary to section
5.22(c). 114 Hence, the court refused to follow Williams and reversed the
trial court's order of specific performance."l 5
Liability of Spouses to Third Persons. In 1971 two husbands bought stock
from the plaintiff and executed a promissory note as partial payment.
108. Id. Operation of a presumption in favor of the surviving spouse was essential to the
husband's claim, because he lacked authority to give his wife's interest to himself. See Martin
v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ).
109. 691 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
110. Id. at 766. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22(c) (Vernon 1975) provides generally that
community property that is not subject to a spouse's sole management under § 5.22(a) is subject to the joint management of the spouses. See id. § 5.22(a). In In re Wolfe, 51 Bankr. 900
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985), the court did not perceive the relevance of either § 5.22(a) or (c) in
sustaining the validity of a security agreement covering household goods that the husband
entered into alone while not in physical possession of the goods. Id. at 903-04. Following In
re Allen, 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984), the court also denied the spouses their right of lien
avoidance under the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 522(0 (1982). 51 Bankr. at 901-03.
111. 514 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ dism'd).
112. Id. at 127.
113. 691 S.W.2d at 767. See Dorsaneo, Compulsory Joinder of Partiesin Texas, 14 Hous.
L. REV. 346, 364 (1977) (questioning precedential value of Williams); McKnight, Family Law:
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 89 (1975) (if a joint act is
required for disposition of an interest, suit based on the acts of one spouse will not segregate
that spouse's interest for purposes of judgment against only one spouse).
114. 691 S.W.2d at 768.
115. Id.
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Neither of the makers' wives joined in the note. In 1981 the makers defaulted on the note and both were thereafter divorced. One of the husbands
later became bankrupt. The payee pursued recovery against the other exhusband and both ex-wives. The action against the ex-wives was based on
the proposition that they were liable for community debts.' 16 The jury
found that the seller agreed to look only to the husbands for satisfaction of
the debt and that neither wife impliedly assented to the debt. Thus, the
1 17
supreme court held that the wives were not liable.
In Greve v. Cox 1 1 8 the husband signed a real estate contract for the husband and wife as buyers. Earnest money was deposited with a title company, and the husband applied for a loan. After a second look at the
property, the wife decided not to sign the contract. Contending that no
binding contract existed, the couple sued the title company for return of the
earnest money. The trial court awarded the money to the seller. The Dallas
court held that the absence of the wife's signature did not affect the rights,
duties, and liabilities of the husband and the seller under the contract.' 19 A
completed contract is shown by the four corners of the contract. 120 By the
contract's terms the seller had the right to retain the cash deposit as liqui12 1
dated damages.
Fraudulent Transfers. Section 3.57 of the Family Code 12 2 provides that if a
spouse transfers community property after the filing of a petition for divorce,
the transfer is void with respect to the other spouse if the transfer was made
with intent to injure the non-transferring spouse, and the person dealing
123
In Sloan v. Sloan 124
with the transferor had notice of the intent to injure.
the couple separated in 1972, and the husband lived with another woman
prior to the suit for divorce. A house was purchased in the name of both the
husband and his companion, although all of the initial payment and all subsequent payments were made by the companion. After filing for divorce the
husband transferred his property interest to his companion. The divorce
court found the transfer void and awarded the husband and wife each a onehalf undivided interest in the property. The appellate court reversed the
judgment of the trial court as to the house and found that it was not commu116. An overgeneralization of the holdings in Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162,
171 (Tex. 1975), and Gleich v. Bongio, 128 Tex. 606, 610, 99 S.W.2d 881, 883 (1937), was

cited in support of this assertion.
117. Williamson v. Dunlap, 693 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. 1985), afl'g 683 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1984); cf In re Jeter, 48 Bankr. 404, 409 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985) (bank's grant-

ing extension of time for payments on indebtedness jointly made by both spouses did not constitute bank's waiver of claim against wife).
118. 683 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
119. Id. at 536 (citing Lefevere v. Sears, 629 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1981, no writ); Cowman v. Allen Monuments, Inc., 500 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1973, writ dism'd)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 537.
122. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
123. Id.
124. 683 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ).
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nity property. 125 Even if the community presumption was applicable to
characterize the husband's apparent interest in the property, in order to set
aside the transfer under section 3.57 the wife had the burden of proving that
her husband intended to defraud her and that the transferor knew of that
intent. 126 The wife failed to provide evidence to meet this burden. 127 This
was clearly a case of the husband's holding on a resulting trust for his friend
and hence his conveyance to her could not have been a fraud on the community estate.
Disposition of Solely-Managed Community Property: Constructive Fraud.
On filing for divorce the wife obtained an order from the court restraining
her husband from changing the beneficiary designation of any life insurance
policy.12 8 A few days later the husband nevertheless changed the beneficiary
of a policy on his life from his wife to his daughter of a previous marriage.
The ex-husband died a few months after the couple was divorced. The exwife brought suit for the proceeds of the policy, but the court's opinion nowhere indicates the disposition of the policy in the divorce decree, apart
from stating that it was subject to the sole control of the decedent. An implication may be drawn from the opinion of the court that the insurance policy
was not disposed of by the divorce court.129 The court nevertheless treated
the change of beneficiary designation of the husband as a marital act dealing
with community property and regarded his violation of the court order in
doing so as irrelevant. 130 The court held that the appellant failed to show
that the new beneficiary had any notice of intent of the insured to harm his
wife within section 3.57131 and that the amount by which the new beneficiary was benefited was fair in light of the size of the community estate.' 3 2
The court further held that assets of the ex-husband's estate were sufficient
to reimburse the ex-wife for any loss she had properly sustained and that her
right of first recourse was against his estate rather than against the
33
beneficiary.'
Homestead: Nature of the Interest. In Johnson v. First Southern Properties134 the plaintiff purchased a condominium subject to covenants that the
owner pay his share of common expenses of administration and maintenance
125. Id. at 753. The statute, of course, applies only to community property. See TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The court considered evidence both that the
house was not community property and that the wife had failed to meet her burden of proof

under section 3.57. See 683 S.W.2d at 752-53.
126. 683 S.W.2d at 752-53; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
127. 683 S.W.2d at 753.
128. Estate of Korzekwa v. Prudential Ins. Co., 669 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, writ dism'd).

129. See id. at 776-77.
130. Id. at 778.
131. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.57 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The court expresses the opinion
that the sole remedy for violation of the order was a motion for contempt, and that remedy
was not sought. 669 S.W.2d at 778.
132. 669 S.W.2d at 777-78.
133. Id. at 778.
134. 687 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
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and that the homeowners' council have a lien on each apartment for any
unpaid assessments. The council was authorized to enforce the lien through
nonjudicial foreclosure. The owner failed to make his monthly maintenance
payments, and his condominium was foreclosed and sold to the defendant.
In a proceeding to set aside the sale the plaintiff argued that his homestead
rights were violated because the lien did not fall within any of the exceptions
to the ban on forced sales of homesteads. 1 35 In rejecting the owner's argument the appellate court concluded that a lien arose at the time of purchase
and hence before the owner established his homestead.' 36 Thus, the court
reached the disquieting conclusion that in that interval between acquisition
and occupancy the owner could waive his homestead claim prospectively so
that a lien could fix on the premises for non-payment of future expenses of
upkeep: 137 "[T]he assessment lien constituted a valid preexisting debt which
138
would overcome the homestead claim."'
A surviving spouse's right to use or occupy property as a homestead after
the death of the other spouse 1 39 is presumed until a party presents affirmative proof of waiver of the right. 40 In Hunterv. Clark'4 1 a premarital agreement provided that the property presently owned by each of the parties
would remain the separate property of that person and that the owner would
have unrestricted power to control, manage, and dispose of the separate
property during the marriage. The couple resided in the wife's separate
house until the wife's death. The wife devised the house to her son, who
claimed a right of exclusive occupancy as against the widower. The court
looked to Williams v. Williams 42 to determine whether the premarital
agreement waived the husband's homestead right.' 43 The Williams agreement stated that each spouse's property would be free from any claim of the
other spouse that might arise as a result of the marriage.144 The agreement
in the case at bar contained no such language.' 4 5 Hence, the husband's right
to continue to use and occupy the house was presumed until the son could
present affirmative proof of waiver of the homestead right. 146 The court
135. The Texas Constitution permits exceptions to the homestead exemption for
(1) purchase money, (2) payment of taxes, and (3) work and material used for improvements.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (Vernon Supp.
1986) (setting forth the exceptions with more specificity).
136. 687 S.W.2d at 401.

137. Id.
138. Id. at 402. Although the court did not cite Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 876
(Tex. 1978), that case supports the proposition that a surviving spouse's homestead right may
be waived prior to occupancy. See id. at 870.
139. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52.
140. Hunter v. Clark, 687 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).

141. Id.
142. 569 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. 1978).

143. 687 S.W.2d at 816.
144. Williams, 569 S.W.2d at 868.
145. 687 S.W.2d at 816.
146. Id. at 817. The court quotes section 5.45 of the Family Code in support of its holding.
Id. This section puts the burden of showing the validity of a marital agreement upon the
proponent of the agreement. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The court
does not disclose whether it grounded the presumption that a surviving spouse has the home-
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concluded that the son had not presented the requisite proof. 147
In Ripley v. Stephens 148 the husband owned, as his separate property, the
house which he and his wife claimed as their homestead for purposes of the
exemption from school ad valorem taxes for persons over age sixty-five. 149
The husband, however, was under the age of sixty-five, whereas the wife was
over that age. Section 11.13 of the Tax Code provides for the school tax
exemption on a residential homestead owned by any person over age sixtyfive. 150 Although the wife qualified for the exemption in abstracto,only the
owner of the residence may claim the exemption. '5 ' The husband was under
the requisite2 age, and hence neither the husband nor the wife could advance
5
the claim.'
Homestead: Designation and Extent. By legislative act 15 3 in 1983 as authorized by constitutional amendment 54 in 1983 the definition of the urban
homestead was changed to one acre of land. Both the constitutional amendment and the statute provide that the new definition is retroactive, 55
thereby perpetuating all existing urban homesteads of not more than one
acre. For awhile the interpretation of the retroactivity provision will remain
in dispute, though there can be no serious doubt that the new definition
applies to all debts arising after the effective date of the legislative change.
For debts arising under the old law, however, doubts may persist for some
time to come.
Three federal courts' 56 sitting in Texas have tackled the question with
somewhat questionable results. In In re Barnhart 57 a bankruptcy court of
the northern district considered the applicability of the amended definition
to debts arising prior to the change and concluded that the definition was
retroactive.' 5 8 In this instance the court's discussion was at a federal constitutional level: whether a state can validly affect pre-existing debts by extending its exemption laws. The attack on retroactivity was mounted under
stead right at issue on this section of the code, the Texas Constitution, or some other rule of
law. See 687 S.W.2d at 817.
147. 687 S.W.2d at 817. The husband's assertion of a homestead tax exemption in favor of
a home he owned but did not live in during the marriage did not affect his assertion that the
wife's house was the couple's homestead. Id. at 815-16.
148. 686 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
149. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-b (authorizing legislature to allow exemption from ad
valorem taxation for persons 65 years of age or older).
150. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.13 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
151. 686 S.W.2d at 759.
152. Id.
153. Act of June 19, 1983, ch. 976, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 5309, 5309-10, replaced by
Act of June 15, 1985, ch. 840, § 1, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6209, 6210 (Vernon).
154. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg., 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6724, 6724-25; see TEX.
CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
155. See Tex. H.R.J. Res. 105, 68th Leg., § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 6724, 6724; TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
156. In re Starns, 52 Bankr. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1985); In re Niland, 50 Bankr. 468 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1985); In re Barnhart, 47 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
157. 47 Bankr. 277 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
158. Id. at 280-81.
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the contract clause of the federal Constitution. 1 59 Under late nineteenth
century decisions of the United States Supreme Court such changes in state
laws have been declared ineffective to cover contractual debts antedating the
amendment. 160 But in 1933 the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that, in a
time of severe economic crisis, established a moratorium on payment of certain secured debts and so allowed the state police-power to prevail over the
contract clause.16 1 In Barnhart the court relied on this later authority 1to
62
make the changed definition retroactive to cover pre-amendment debts.
The argument is dubious at best. The Texas economic crisis of 1983, if there
was one, was certainly not of the magnitude of that to which the Minnesota
police-power responded. A more outrageous application of the retroactively
redefined urban homestead was in In re Niland,163 however. Without any
discussion of its possible invalidity another bankruptcy court gave effect to
the 1983 legislation to invalidate a non-judicial foreclosure sale that ocamendcurred in August 1983, prior to the adoption of the constitutional
164
ment and the effective date of its implementing legislation.
A federal district court for the southern district considered a different
facet of the retroactivity problem in In re Starns.165 There the debtor
claimed an urban residential homestead exemption of a 2.26-acre tract in the
town of Midway. He alleged that the tract had a value of $10,000 or less at
the time of homestead designation. A corporate creditor who had taken its
1982 contractual indebtedness to judgment sought an order from the court
to lift the bankruptcy stay so that the creditor could foreclose its judgment
lien in state court against the debtor's non-exempt property. The law in
effect when the debtor contracted with his creditor defined the urban homestead exemption as land worth $10,000, without improvements," 66 and thus
would have exempted the entire tract. The debtor argued that retroactive
application of the new rule 167 would violate principles of due process. Indeed, the general purpose of the change was to expand homestead protection
68
in light of the diminishing value of the exemption relative to the market,
but if retroactive in its application its effect in this instance would be to
159.

"No State shall ..

U.S. CONST. art. I,

.

pass any ...

§ 10, cl. 1.

Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts

......

160. See Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595, 607 (1877); Gunn v. Barry, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
610, 623-24 (1872).
161. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434-35 (1933); see also Allied
Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1978) (contract clause violation);
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 32 (1977) (contract clause violation); cf
Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194 (1983) (no contract clause violation); Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 419 (1983) (no contract
clause violation).
162. In re Barnhart, 47 Bankr. 277, 280-81 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
163. 50 Bankr. 468 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
164. Id. at 478.
165. 52 Bankr. 405 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
166. See Act of June 18, 1969, ch. 841, § 1, 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws 2518, 2518-19.
167. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
168. In re Barnhart, 47 Bankr. 277, 283 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985). The Starns court notes
another plausible, but fanciful, purpose of the amendment as described by commentators who
were not privy to the deliberations. See 52 Bankr. at 413 n.18.
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reduce the exemption. The court noted the inconsistency between the purpose of the amendment and its application in the case before it but nevertheless held that the debtor had not overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of legislative acts. 169 In lifting the stay imposed on the
creditor the court left the manner of determining the particular exempt acre70
age to the state court in the foreclosure proceeding.'
The so-called retroactivity provision in the constitutional amendment was
a hastily conceived and somewhat clumsy drafting device to perpetuate existing urban homesteads defined in terms of value rather than area. Its interpretation should be evenhandedly applied. If the retroactive effect of the
amendment cannot reach the enforcement of contractual obligations entered
into under the old law, a correlative interpretation of the provision in the
interest of debtors should also be applied. But retroactivity should also be
avoided. Thus, for debtors and creditors alike it should relate back no further than the day on which the constitutional amendment took effect.' 7 '
72
As the court points out in Starns,1
the urban business homestead and the
urban residential homestead together make up the urban homestead, however defined. For reasons that are not altogether clear the debtor also
claimed a .78 acre tract also located in Midway. The debtor had valued the
alleged business homestead property at $30,000, but its value at the time of
asserted designation is not indicated. Without focusing on the absurdity of
this exemption claim, which apparently could not qualify under either old or
new exemption law, the court simply pointed out that its use was merely
ancillary to the business activities1 73 carried on at leased premises eleven
miles away and thus could not come within the definition of business homestead property as enunciated in Ford v. Aetna Insurance Co. 174
The facts of In re Claflin175 are so nicely balanced that choosing between
the merits of the parties' positions is enormously difficult. The question was
whether a divorced mother with custody of minor children loses her homestead as a matter of law when she remarries and moves her family to the
residence of her new husband, despite an agreement between the spouses
that her prior home would continue to be the family homestead until she
acquired a new home. The mother had resided with her children in her
169. 52 Bankr. at 413 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)).
170. Id. at 412. In In re Rowe, No. 284-20097, slip op. at 8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., March 14,
1985), the court held that the one-acre exemption applied to an existing homestead as against
claims asserted by the trustee in a bankruptcy proceeding filed after the effective date of the
statute setting the one-acre exemption. The court, however, left for the decision of state courts
any claim of judgment creditors whose liens had been filed prior to the statute's enactment.
Id., slip op. at 8-9.
171. This seems to have been the interpretation adopted in Rowe. See supra note 170.
172. 52 Bankr. at 408 n.5.
173. Id. at 415.
174. 424 S.W.2d 612, 615-16 (Tex. 1968); see Haynes v. Vermillion, 242 S.W.2d 444, 446
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Under the Ford test, the business homestead extends to property used for the operation of the business that is necessary to such busi-

ness and not merely used in aid thereof. 424 S.W.2d at 615-16.
175. 761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1985).
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separate homestead in Houston. She then moved to Austin to pursue a professional career, and there she lived with a man whom she later married.
After the marriage the wife's children, who had apparently lived elsewhere
for several months, joined the spouses, and the family continued to live in
the husband's separate house in Austin. The family later moved to an apartment in Austin, although the husband retained his home. The spouses testified that they had agreed that either the Houston property would serve as
the homestead for the family or would be sold and the homestead transferred
to a new property to be acquired by the wife in Austin. The wife contracted
to purchase a home in Austin but did not sell the Houston property, and the
family did not move to the new property. In the wife's subsequent bankruptcy proceeding she claimed the Houston property as her homestead. The
bankruptcy court concluded that the Houston premises were vacated only
temporarily and remained the family's homestead. The court, therefore, set
aside the Houston property to the wife as her homestead, and a lien creditor
appealed.
The Fifth Circuit court held that the wife as a member of a new family
had failed to establish the Houston property as the family homestead. 176 In
so holding the appellate court apparently regarded the couple's agreement as
irrelevant on the grounds that the new family never occupied the Houston
premises and that the agreement constituted nothing more than a vague,
contingent plan to move to Houston. 177 The court relied heavily on the
1972 Texas Supreme Court holding in Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley 178 for the
conclusion that the wife's intent was irrelevant in light of the new family's
actual use and occupancy of the husband's home in Austin.1 79 Hence, the
family's occupancy of the husband's home amounted to an abandonment of
the Houston property's homestead character as a matter of law.
The resolution of the problem is indeed difficult and depends very much
on which facts are emphasized. The appellate court regarded the establishment of the new family as a fact of great significance along with the fact that
the new family's actual place of residence was in Austin.18 0 The bankruptcy
court, however, put controlling emphasis on the initial establishment of the
Houston property as the homestead of the old family and the rule that its
homestead character is not lost until abandonment is proved.' 81 If the
176. Id. at 1093.
177. Id. at 1091.
178. 475 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1972); see In re Cumpton, 30 Bankr. 49, 51 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1983).
179. 761 F.2d at 1091.
180. Id. at 1091-92.
181. Id. at 1092. The Fifth Circuit commented that abandonment need not determine the
resolution of the issue but noted that acquisition of a new homestead establishes as a matter of
law the abandonment of the old homestead. Id. at 1092 n.3 (citing In re Cumpton, 30 Bankr.
49, 51 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983); Norman v. First State Bank & Trust, 557 S.W.2d 797, 801
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1977, writ refd n.r.e.)). But a fundamental issue is
whether a new homestead was established. See In re Byrd, 39 Bankr. 374, 377 (Bankr. W.D.
La. 1984) (temporary move from Texas to Louisiana does not constitute abandonment of the
Texas homestead).
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couple's agreement was entered into before the move to Austin, I8 2 much can
be said for the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the Houston premises
were vacated only temporarily and hence remained the family's homestead.
The call is very close, but if the spouse's agreement was made prior to any
actual occupancy of the husband's home by the couple as husband and wife,
the bankruptcy court's holding seems the better one.
A homestead is not abandoned when the claimant simply lives elsewhere
temporarily and rents the home to tenants.1 83 As the time away from the
home progresses, however, it becomes factually more likely that a court will
view non-occupancy as an abandonment. In proving abandonment a contestant need not show the claimant's acquisition of a new homestead, but
when non-occupancy is factually coupled with a change of the claimant's
marital status and the family continues to reside away from the original
home, the argument for abandonment becomes stronger. The federal appellate court seems to have found this argument persuasive. On the other hand,
while in Houston the mother was not merely maintaining a homestead as a
single adult as the appellate court stated' 8 4 but was maintaining a family
homestead as the head of a family with three minor children, who continued
to live with her in Austin after her remarriage. The bankruptcy court was
not persuaded that the mere addition of a new husband to the family and the
temporary occupancy of his home altered the mother's ability to claim the
Houston homestead.
Homestead: Filing and Enforcing Liens. The Fifth Circuit court in In re
Daves 18 5 held that a debtor's oral promise did not satisfy the formal constitutional and statutory requirements for creating a lien on homestead property,
86
albeit under the circumstances a lien could properly fix on the homestead. 1
The debtor had obtained a series of unsecured loans for improvements on
both his residence and business homestead. These loans were made in partial reliance on the debtor's promise to assign to the lender an existing recorded mechanic's lien for improvements. A subsequent release of the
mechanic's lien made the debtor's compliance impossible. In response to the
creditor's claim the bankruptcy court imposed an equitable lien in favor of
the lender against both the properties based upon the debtor's oral agree182. The mother seems to have moved to Austin without the children, but the facts supply
no indication that she did not retain the Houston home for homestead purposes as she was
entitled to do. See Renaldo v. Bank of San Antonio, 630 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex. 1982), in
which the court stated that a divorced father could maintain a homestead for his child of
whom he was merely the possessory conservator. See also In re Barnett, 33 Bankr. 70, 71-72
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (divorced father with child support obligations entitled to real and
personal property exemptions for a family).
183. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon Supp.
1986); see also In re Root, No. 281-00035, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., June 29, 1981)
(holding that rental of a portion of the claimant's residence did not reduce the homestead
protection accorded the entire lot).
184. 761 F.2d at 1090, 1092.
185. 770 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1985).
186. Id. at 1369.
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18 7
ment to provide a valid lien.
The federal appellate court held that no equitable lien could be impressed
on the homestead because the creditor had not complied with the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions as to form.' 8 8 Those
provisions clearly require joinder of the wife in the creation of a lien for
homestead improvements.1 89 The wife made no representations to the
lender with respect to placing a lien on the homestead. Thus, the court held
that no lien was created under Texas law. 190 The court also rejected the
lender's attempt to analogize a mechanic's lien to a vendor's lien, which
arises by implication of law to secure payments of the purchase money.191
The lender argued that the debtor's statements that he would place a valid
mechanic's lien on the homestead property for the cost of improvement
thereto gave rise to an equitable lien. The appeals court contrasted the statutory language authorizing homestead liens for improvement19 2 and those securing purchase-money 19 3 and noted that the latter do not require
formalities as strict as the former. 194 Under the circumstances no equitable
lien could be imposed to the extent that monies were lent to make improvements on the homestead property.' 9 5
In United States v. Chapman196 the United States had taken a judgment
for unpaid excise taxes owed by the husband alone. The United States then
sought to enforce a tax lien on residential property, occupied by the husband
and wife, though title to the property was in the name of the taxpayer's
daughter. The taxpayer had conveyed his home to his son, who later transferred it to the daughter. The family continued to live there, and several
years later the daughter exchanged that house for the present home in which
the couple lived.
The federal district court found that the transfers were made with intent
to defraud the Internal Revenue Service from collecting taxes due and that
the children took the property knowing of the parents' fraudulent intent.
Thus, under Texas law the transfer was void as to the United States and
subject to seizure and sale for satisfaction of the tax lien.' 97 The taxpayer

187. Id. at 1366.
188. Id. at 1369. The constitutional and statutory requirements for obtaining a lien for
improvements against a homestead are: (1) a written contract, (2) signed by both spouses, and
(3) recorded in the county where the homestead is situated. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEX.
PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.059 (Vernon 1984).
189. See supra note 188.
190. 770 F.2d at 1369; see also Great Eastern Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 526 S.W.2d 268, 26970 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (note and deed of trust for improvements on homestead did not create lien because common-law wife did not sign either instrument); Tezel & Cotter v. Roark, 301 S.W.2d 179, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957,
writ refd) (no lien against homestead because the wife did not sign the contract).
191. 770 F.2d at 1370.
192. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.059 (Vernon 1984).
193. See id. § 41.001(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
194. 770 F.2d at 1370.
195. The court remanded for consideration of whether the lender had an implied vendor's
lien on the business homestead property. Id. at 1370-71.
196. 756 F.2d 1237 (5th Cir. 1985).
197. Id. at 1240-41; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.02, 24.03 (Vernon 1968).
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and his wife argued that the house was their homestead and that the wife
was entitled to compensation from the proceeds of sale for her homestead
interest.
The lower court found that neither of the parents had claimed the house
as a homestead and that both had sworn that they occupied it as tenants of
their daughter. Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Stevens v.
Cobern,198 the appellate court added that Texas law would probably not allow a homestead claim for a grantor who fraudulently conveyed the property to another because the fraudulent conveyance would be valid between
the parties to the deed. 199 The court distinguished the contrary conclusion
in the almost identical federal district court case of United States v. Wilson 2 00 on the ground that the claimants in that case did not disclaim any
intent to occupy the premises as a homestead. 20 1 The court also stressed the
fact that in this case the claimants had never had legal title to the house in
20 2
which they lived.

A federal tax lien is enforceable against the homestead 20 3 and is
unimpaired by the debtor's transfer of the interest on divorce. 20 4 In Harris
v. United States20 5 the Internal Revenue Service had acquired a tax lien
against the husband. In a subsequent divorce the homestead was awarded to
the wife. She later sold the residence, and the Service claimed an interest in
the proceeds in satisfaction of its lien. The trial court held that the United
States had a valid tax lien against the homestead. On her appeal, the ex-wife
argued that her homestead interest was superior to the tax lien and, alternatively, that the trial court incorrectly valued her interest in the homestead.
The Fifth Circuit court affirmed the district court's holding that the transfer of the ex-husband's homestead rights on divorce did not affect the validity of the existing tax lien. 20 6 The court agreed with the trial court's
conclusion that a division of property on divorce is not a sale, 20 7 which8
20
would preclude the validity of the lien under the Internal Revenue Code.
In valuing the ex-wife's homestead interest the court applied 20 9 the
method of valuation suggested by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Rodgers.2 10 There the Court held that a nondebtor spouse must be compen198. 213 S.W. 925 (Tex. 1919).
199. 756 F.2d at 1243-44 (citing Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex. 1964)).
200. 500 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
201. 756 F.2d at 1244; see Wilson, 500 F. Supp. at 833.
202. 756 F.2d at 1243-44.
203. United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 690-98 (1983). This is so even if the Texas
homestead right is an estate in land, and not merely an exemption, and vests in each spouse an
interest similar to an undivided life estate. Id. at 686.
204. Harris v. United States, 764 F.2d 1126, 1129 (5th Cir. 1985).
205. 764 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1985).
206. Id. at 1129. The court appears to assume that the lien had fixed on the property prior
to the divorce. See id. If the lien fixed subsequently, the divorce court's partition should have
protected the wife's rights.
207. Id.
208. I.R.C. § 6323 (1982).
209. 764 F.2d at 1131. The district court used a six percent rate to value the ex-wife's
estate. Id. at 1130.
210. 461 U.S. 677 (1985).
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sated for the loss of a homestead interest when a lien for taxes due from the
other spouse is enforced. 2 1' The illustration used in Rodgers to demonstrate
the valuation of a homestead interest assumed the existence of a surviving
nondebtor spouse. 2 12 In the more typical situation, as was the case initially
in Harris,both spouses have a homestead interest in their home. 21 3 In addition, each spouse owns a contingent future possessory homestead interest
subject to survivorship. 21 4 Finally, each spouse owns a remainder interest in
a community home. 21 5 Only the nondebtor spouse's homestead interest is
compensable upon foreclosure. 21 6 The court held that the Service was entitled to the husband's homestead interest as well as the husband's remainder
interest in the property, 217 and that the lower court should have used actua218
rial tables to compute the interests of both ex-spouses in the property.
In accordance with its opinion in Harristhe Fifth Circuit court in United
States v. Molina2 19 reversed the lower court's valuation of a nondebtor
spouse's homestead interest. 220 There the Internal Revenue Service foreclosed a tax lien against the spouses' homestead. The district court properly
concluded that the wife's homestead interest was compensable under United
States v. Rodgers22' but incorrectly valued the spouses' interest as though it
were claimed by the wife alone, rather than by both spouses. 2 22 The appellate court relied on its opinion in Harris223 to require that when both spouses
be valued using tables which account for
own the homestead, the estate must 224
the concurrent use of the property.

The constitutional protection of the homestead has been improperly extended to the use of embezzled funds to pay for improvements to a previously existing homestead. In Curtis Sharp Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover225 a
court fixed an equitable lien on the wife's undivided one-half interest in the
homestead in favor of her defrauded employer. The judgment was not appealed, but in a subsequent suit to foreclose the lien the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the husband and wife. The Dallas Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the equitable lien imposed
against a previously acquired homestead was unenforceable as a violation of
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 698 (citing I.R.C. § 7403 (1982)).
Id.
764 F.2d at 1131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

218. Id.
219. 764 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of the lower court's disposition of
Molina see McKnight, Family Law.: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw.
L.J. 1, 22 (1985).
220. 764 F.2d at 1133.

221. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
222. 764 F.2d at 1133. See United States v. Molina, 584 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D. Tex.

1984), rev'd, 764 F.2d 1132, 1133 (5th Cir. 1985).
223. Harris v. United States, 764 F.2d 1126, 1131 (5th Cir. 1985).
224. 764 F.2d at 1133.
225. 701 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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constitutional homestead protection, 226 relying on Barnett v. Eureka Paving
Co. 22 7 The court distinguished those cases that imposed a constructive trust
on embezzled funds that were applied to a subsequently declared homestead. 228 In those cases, the court reasoned, a trust was imposed on the
later-acquired property ab initio, and homestead designation did not protect
the stolen funds. 229 The court simply ignored contrary authority more
nearly in point. 230 In dissent Justice Akin argued the sounder approach that
the wife's wrongdoing prevented the employer from complying with the constitutional provisions for imposing a lien on a homestead. By refusing to
uphold the imposition of this lien, the dissent contended, the majority extended constitutional protection to the thief who uses stolen funds to im23 1
prove his homestead.
Exempt Personalty. Under the 1984 amendment to Bankruptcy Code section 522(m), stacking of state and federal exemptions is no longer permitted
to married couples. 2 3 2 Hence, one debtor-spouse may not claim federal ex233
emptions while the other spouse claims property exempt under state law.
In a case decided before the amendment took effect, the bankruptcy court
allowed debtor-spouses to claim property as exempt under the different exemption systems.23 4 In In re Tillerson235 both debtor-spouses claimed as exempt part of an insurance policy on the life of the husband. The wife, who
was the named beneficiary of the policy, claimed the federal exemptions
under section 522(d) 2 36 on a portion of the cash surrender value of the policy, and the husband claimed a state exemption for the remaining value of
the policy. The trustee objected to the claimed exemptions, contending that
the policy's cash value could be exempted only under one exemption system.
The bankruptcy court denied the trustee's challenge. 237 The court considered Texas courts' liberality in allowing exemptions and the fact that the
238
debtors' petition was filed prior to the effective date of the amendment.
The court further held that a joint filing by the insured husband and beneficiary-wife did not prevent the husband from claiming the policy as exempt
226. Id. at 28; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
227. 234 S.W. 1081 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1921, holding approved).
228. First State Bank v. Zelesky, 262 S.W. 190, 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1924, no
writ) (constructive trust applied to embezzled funds used to purchase home); Smith v. Green,
234 S.W. 1006, 1008 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1922, writ refd) (partnership funds used to
improve homestead that was later exchanged for another was subject to constructive trust).
229. 701 S.W.2d at 25-26.
230. See In re Hunter, No. BK-4-350, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Tex., Apr. 7, 1967); Baucum v.
Texam Oil Corp. 423 S.W.2d 434, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
231. 701 S.W.2d at 29 (Akin, J., dissenting).
232. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 306, 98 Stat. 333, 353.
233. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 522(b), 522(m) (West 1979 & Pam. Supp. 1986).
234. In re Tillerson, 49 Bankr. 11, 12-13 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
235. 49 Bankr. II (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).
236. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982).
237. 49 Bankr. at 13.
238. Id. at 12. The amendment became effective for cases filed 90 days after July 10, 1984,
the date of enactment. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, § 553(a), 98 Stat. 333, 392.
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under state law. 239 In so holding the court noted that the state exemption is
designed to protect the family, and that from its inception the Texas rule in
favor of the life-insurance exemption has provided that a policy which names
a family member as beneficiary is exempt. 240 The court found no Texas case
holding that a wife before the bankruptcy court is not a member of her hus242
band's family. 24' The court, therefore, allowed the claimed exemptions.
Noticeably absent from the court's opinion is a determination of the wife's
ability to claim the policy when her existing creditors could not have
reached her interest therein and she lacked any management powers over
that policy. If the policy was community property solely managed by the
husband, the wife's non-tortious creditors could not reach it for the satisfaction of her debts and, therefore, the wife could not claim the policy as ex2 43
empt in abstracto.
In Perkins v. Perkins244 the El Paso Court of Appeals held that civil service retirement benefits are not exempt from garnishment. 245 The court relied solely on its reasoning in United States v. Fleming.246 In Fleming the
court held that military retirement benefits are the debtor's property and not
"current wages" within the constitutional prohibition. 247
In In re Rowe the court drew a distinction between items of "normal
household use" and "luxury items which were acquired for speculative or
investment purposes. '248 The former could be claimed as exempt under the
Bankruptcy Code249 and the Property Code, 250 whereas the latter could
not. 25 1 The court also reiterated the holding in In re Wahl 252 that the item
limitation of $200 under section 522(d)(3) applies to individual items of table
silver because "each particular knife, fork or spoon is a separate item,
although the items are the same pattern and constitute a 'set' of
253
silverware."
239. 49 Bankr. at 12. The court cites In re Cannady, 653 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir. 1981), as
authority for allowing a spouse to claim federal exemptions even though the other spouse has
claimed a family exemption under state law. 49 Bankr. at 12.
240. 49 Bankr. at 12 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(7) (Vernon 1984)).
241. Id. at 13. Hence the court was free to find that the wife was a member of the insured's

family under the facts in issue. Id.
242. Id.
243. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975). But see
In re Barnes, 14 Bankr. 788, 790 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) (husband not limited to exempting
his community half of the wife's income tax refund when a joint petition is filed and the refund
is community property under the sole management of the wife).
244. 690 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
245. Id. at 708.
246. 565 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1978, no writ).
247. Id. at 88-89; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 28. If the wages are still in the hands of the
employer, they are exempt. If the employee has received the wages, they are not exempt. See
id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 63.004 (Vernon Pam. 1986).
248. In re Rowe, No. 284-20097, slip op. at 19-20 (Bankr. N.D. Tex., March 14, 1985).
249. 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(d)(3) (West Pam. Supp. 1986).
250. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(1) (Vernon 1980) ("home furnishings").
251. No. 284-20097, slip op. at 19-20.
252. 14 Bankr. 153, 156 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1981).
253. No. 284-20097, slip op. at 22.
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DIVISION ON DIVORCE

PropertySettlement Agreements. In February of 1980 a couple entered into a
"Property Settlement and Support Agreement, '2 54 in which they declared
that they intended to separate. In the agreement the husband declared himself trustee of all his future military retirement pay for the benefit of his wife
and child. The agreement set aside the homestead and particular personal
property to the wife and other personal property to the husband. The parties further agreed that a divorce court should approve and incorporate the
agreement in a divorce decree. The couple then separated, but later reconciled briefly, and it was not until January of 1982 that the husband sued for
divorce. 255 At a hearing in April of 1982 the court, apparently constrained
by the McCarty decision, 2 56 concluded that the agreement was not "just and
right" under section 3.631 of the Family Code2 57 and awarded all the husband's military retirement pay to the husband. 258 On appeal the ex-wife
argued that the agreement constituted a marital partition 259 under Family
Code section 5.42260 and was, therefore, not subject to review by the divorce
court. 26 1 The San Antonio court held that, by virtue of the fact that the trial
court ruled on the fairness of the agreement, the judge implicitly treated the
agreement as an agreement incident to divorce and not as a partition, which
254. Patino v. Patino, 687 S.W.2d 799, 800-01 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
255. Id.
256. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 233 (1981) (holding that nondisability military
retirement benefits are not divisible as community property by state courts). For discussion of
McCarty and subsequent legislation removing its restrictions, see infra notes 410-21 and accompanying text.
257. The Family Code provides:
Agreement Incident to Divorce or Annulment
(a) To promote amicable settlement of disputes on the divorce or annulment
of a marriage, the parties may enter into a written agreement concerning the
division of all property and liabilities of the parties and maintenance of either of
them....
(b) In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the terms of the agreement are
binding on the court unless it finds that the agreement is not just and right....
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
A judge's approval of such an agreement is not always apparent. In K.D.B. v. C.B.B., 688
S.W.2d 684 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ), the divorce decree expressly incorporated a
portion of the parties' agreement regarding the property division but failed to incorporate
provisions regarding conservatorship and support. In lieu of those latter provisions the decree
ordered the wife to pay child support in accordance with the trial judge's own formula. Id. at
686. The court of appeals held that the action of the trial court in ordering the payment of
child support amounted to a disapproval of the parties' entire agreement. Id. at 687.
For a discussion of an ambiguous provision in a property settlement agreement dealing with
a life insurance policy, see Estate of Welker v. Welker, 683 S.W.2d 211, 213 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1985, no writ) (reversal necessary when fact issue arose as to whom decedent intended
to maintain as beneficiary under agreement).
258. 687 S.W.2d at 801.
259. The Texas Constitution permits spouses to partition or exchange community property
and change its character to separate property. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15. The Family Code
similarly repeats the constitutional authority with legislative embellishment. TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 5.42, .44, .45 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
260. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.42 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
261. 687 S.W.2d at 801.

1986]

FAMILY LAW. HUSBAND AND WIFE

that porwould not require his approval. 262 The court, therefore, affirmed
263
tion of the judgment which set aside the separation agreement.
On its facts Patino v. Patino is a case in which the separation agreement
clearly anticipated a divorce, but the proceeding that ultimately ensued two
years later may not have been the divorce suit anticipated by the agreement.
The court did not address this issue since the controversy was narrowed by
the ex-wife's contention that the agreement was a marital partition and not a
property settlement agreement as the appellate court ultimately
264
concluded.
If a couple enters into an unconditional marital partition of their community property as constitutionally provided 265 and one party later files for divorce, the partition is not properly subject to repudiation under section
3.631266 unless an opponent to the partition can show that the agreement
was entered into in anticipation of divorce. 267 Whether a partition constitutes such an agreement is a matter of fact subject to determination by a
divorce court. 268 Any partition is, of course, also subject to attack under
section 5.45,269 but if the proponent of the partition satisfies the court that
the agreement was entered into without fraud, duress, or overreaching, its
terms are not subject to review under section 3.631 unless the court also
finds that the parties anticipated a divorce and the partition was meant as a
property settlement agreement. 270 Time is a vital factor in the resolution of
this issue. If a petition for divorce has been filed prior to the execution of the
partition or if the petition is filed immediately after its execution, a party
may cogently argue a factual nexus between the agreement and the petition
for divorce. But as the lapse of time after the consummation of the partition
progresses, it becomes less likely that a court will treat the partition as an
agreement made in anticipation of divorce if it is not so identified by the
parties. The contents and tone of the partition may also insulate it from any
assertion that it was made in anticipation of divorce.
In 1981, shortly after the United States Supreme Court decided the McCarty case, 27 1 a couple entered into a property settlement agreement in
which they agreed that the husband-serviceman would have all of his military retirement benefits. The agreement was incorporated in the divorce decree. In 1983 the ex-wife filed a petition for a bill of review in which she
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 802.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 801-02.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.

266. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
267. Id.
268. See Patino, 687 S.W.2d at 802.
269. Section 5.45 provides that the proponent of an agreement or partition has the burden
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the other party gave informed consent and
that the transaction was free of fraud, duress, or overreaching. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.45
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
270. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
271. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). For specific discussion of military retirement benefits in the context of property division on divorce, see infra notes 410-53 and accompanying text.
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asserted that the subsequent enactment of the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act 272 discharged the basis of the agreement and thus
made the decree subject to being set aside. The court of appeals disagreed,
holding that the compromise agreement was binding on the parties and
could not be set aside by bill of review. 273 The court cited 274 a prior decision 275 in which it had held that a change in judicial interpretation or view
of applicable law after the entering of a final judgment does not provide a
basis for bill of review. 276 The court further agreed with the ex-husband that
a party is not prevented under Texas case law from bargaining away his
separate property and noted that in the present case the agreement was vol277
untary and bargained for.

In Cluck v. Cluck 278 the ex-wife sought enforcement of payments from her
ex-husband due her under the parties' divorce decree. At a hearing on the
ex-wife's motion in aid of collection of the judgment the parties entered into
a settlement agreement, under which the ex-husband agreed to a new schedule of payments in satisfaction of the original decree, and the ex-wife released a judgment lien under that decree. The agreement was entered as the
judgment of the court. The ex-wife later filed another motion for collection
of the judgment, but this relief was denied; the trial court entered judgment
incorporating the settlement agreement as binding in lieu of the original divorce decree. 279 On appeal the San Antonio court held that the agreed judgment was binding and enforceable, and entry of the final written order
precluded further proceedings to enforce or collect sums allegedly due under
the original divorce decree. 280 In rejecting the contention of the ex-wife that
the lower court was without authority to modify the divorce decree, the appellate court stated that the order appealed from merely confirmed the settlement agreement and in no way modified the original decree. 2 8'
Texas decisions 282 conflict to some degree on the issue of raising contrac272. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982).
273. Walker v. Walker, 691 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
274. Id. at 104-05.

275. Smith v. Manger, 449 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1970, no writ).
276. Id. at 349.
277. 691 S.W.2d at 105.
278. 699 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ requested). Earlier disposition
of Cluck is discussed in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 166-67 (1984).
279. 699 S.W.2d at 248.
280. Id. at 250.
281. Id. at 251.
282. See, e.g., McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. 1979) (although rules relating to the interpretation of contracts apply, an agreed judgment is accorded the same degree of
finality as a contested final judgment); Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967) (a
property settlement agreement incorporated in a decree-and apparently beyond the power of
the court to decree-has whatever legal force the law of contracts will give it); Colquette v.
Forbes, 680 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ) (a property settlement agreement that is incorporated into a divorce decree is treated as a contract, quoting McGoodwin v.
McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex. 1984)); Conner v. Bean, 630 S.W.2d 697, 699-700
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (contract defenses which attack the
validity of an agreement incorporated in a decree are barred as collateral attacks on a final
decree of divorce); Sorrels v. Sorrels, 592 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979,
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tual defenses to attack judgments that incorporate property settlement agreements. In 1979 the Texas Supreme Court in Ex parte Gorena283 forbade the
raising of contractual defenses in suits to enforce agreed judgments on the
ground that such defenses constituted impermissible collateral attacks on
prior judgments. 284 The court expressly disapproved 28 5 of the analysis in Ex
parte Jones,286 in which it had held that the law of contracts governs the
enforcement of agreed judgments. 287 In 1984, however, the supreme court
held in McGoodwin v. McGoodwin288 that construction of a marital property
agreement, though
incorporated in a divorce decree, is governed by the law
28 9
of contracts.
In Miller v. Miller2 90 the Dallas Court of Appeals resorted to the law of
contracts in order to resolve an ambiguity in an agreed judgment. 29 1 The
parties entered into a property settlement agreement, which expressly disposed of certain corporate stock but which failed to dispose of certain other
stock. The agreement nevertheless contained a general provision disposing
of personal property in the possession of the ex-husband, and the ex-husband
argued that the omitted stock passed under this provision. 2 92 The court of
appeals, however, reasoned on the analogy of rules governing contract interpretation that the resolution of an ambiguity in an agreed judgment depends
on the intention of the parties as disclosed by the judgment and surrounding
circumstances, and such a resolution permits the admission of extrinsic evidence. 29 3 The court then noted that the decree expressly disposed of all
shares of stock except those in dispute and that both parties testified that
they did not intend that the decree should include that stock. 294 The court,
writ refd n.r.e.) (in an action to recover payments under a property settlement agreement

incorporated in a decree, an ex-spouse is permitted to establish defenses of waiver, limitations,
and payment); Peddicord v. Peddicord, 522 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont

1975, writ refd n.r.e.) (to allow a defendant to raise contractual defenses to a property settlement agreement incorporated in a decree would be to allow a collateral attack on that judgment); Martinez v. Guajardo, 464 S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no

writ) (a provision of a property settlement agreement incorporated into a judgment is interpreted by the laws relating to contracts, rather than laws relating to judgments).
283. 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979).

284. Id. at 844. In Gorena the ex-husband was jailed for contempt for failing to make
payments due his ex-wife under the divorce decree. Id. at 843. The ex-husband argued that

the trial court was without power to hold him in contempt because the agreed judgment was
enforceable only as a contract. Id. at 844. The court rejected the contention. Id.

285. Id. at 844-45.
286.

163 Tex. 513, 358 S.W.2d 370 (1962).

287. Id. at 520, 358 S.W.2d at 375.
288. 671 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1984).

289. Id. at 882. Hence the court concluded that under the facts before it a divorce decree
approving a property settlement agreement by which one spouse is allowed to purchase the

other spouse's interest in particular realty establishes a vendor's lien in favor of the seller. Id.
The McGoodwin decision is discussed in McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 1, 26 (1985).

290. 700 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
291. Id. at 951 (citing Hutchings v. Bates, 406 S.W.2d 419, 420 (Tex. 1966); Ex parte
Jones, 163 Tex. 513, 520, 358 S.W.2d 370, 375 (1962)).

292. Id. at 950.
293. Id. at 951.
294. Id.
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therefore, concluded that the divorce decree did not dispose of the stock. 29 5
In Herbert v. Herbert296 the Fort Worth court has attempted to reconcile
these conflicting approaches. There the court of appeals held that in suits to
enforce agreed judgments the parties may raise contract defenses in determining the measure of damages, but they may not do so if the effect would
be to abrogate the final judgment. 297 In Herbert the property division of the
parties in the divorce decree was based entirely upon a property settlement
agreement. The agreement awarded the ex-husband certain personal items
in the possession of the ex-wife and awarded the ex-wife half of the ex-husband's military retirement pay. On the ex-wife's failure to surrender some of
the personalty, the ex-husband refused to send half of the retirement pay to
her. The ex-wife, therefore, sought enforcement of the agreement, and the
ex-husband urged failure of consideration and breach of contract. 29 8 The
trial court found that the ex-wife had not substantially complied with the
property settlement agreement and that she was, therefore, not entitled to
299
recover any portion of her ex-husband's retirement pay.
The court of appeals first noted that Texas cases were in conflict on the
issue of allowing contractual defenses to the enforcement of agreed judgments. 30 0 After concluding that the trial court had improperly refused to
submit to the jury tendered issues on specific performance and damages for
breach,30 1 the court said that contract defenses may be used only to determine the appropriate measure of damages, and in so holding the court said
that it acted in accordance with the policies of protecting the finality and
30 2
validity of agreed judgments.
The holding of the court is loosely worded and its meaning is unclear.
First, if the court meant that parties to an enforcement proceeding may
plead and prove contractual defenses, its holding squarely conflicts with Ex
parte Gorena.30 3 Second, the court's statement that an agreed judgment is to
be enforced as a contract 30 4 fails to take account of certain recently enacted
provisions of the Family Code, 30 5 which set forth specific procedures for
enforcement of property divisions. Third, when the court states that parties
may not raise contract defenses if the effect would be "to abrogate totally the
295. Id. The ex-husband further sought to claim the stock under an alleged oral partition
agreement entered into after the parties' separation but before their divorce. Id. The Family
Code requires that such agreements be in writing and subscribed by the parties. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 5.44 (Vernon Supp. 1986). The court refused to recognize an exception to these
requirements for agreements made after permanent separation. 700 S.W.2d at 951-52.
296. 694 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
297. Id. at 649-50.
298. Id. at 647-48.
299. Id. at 648.
300. Id. at 649.
301. Id. at 650.
302. Id.
303. 595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979). Gorena is discussed supra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
304. 694 S.W.2d at 649.
305. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
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final judgment, '30 6 it implies that it would tolerate a partial abrogation of a
final judgment, which is nonsense.
FiduciaryDuty Affecting Division. A couple was engaged to be married after
a long and close relationship.30 7 After the man had signed the offer to
purchase a house, the couple agreed between themselves to "buy the residence jointly, use the property as their mutual marital homestead, borrow
funds sufficient to purchase said property, using their collective borrowing
power and credit reputation, and jointly repay such indebtedness from funds
they would later earn."' 308 Before the closing the man told the attorney to
make the deed solely in his name, and the man alone signed the note and
deed of trust. He did not tell his prospective wife of these changes but did
tell her that she would not need to attend the closing. The couple resided in
the house during their marriage and until their separation. The couple made
substantial improvements on the house with community funds and community labor. No dispute arose that required them to consider the issue of
ownership. On divorce the court imposed a constructive trust on the property so that the husband held an undivided one-half interest in the property
for his wife's benefit.
On the husband's appeal the Austin court upheld the imposition of the
constructive trust.30 9 The court noted that the lower court had viewed the
constructive trust as an enforcement of the parties' agreement, which occurred within a confidential and fiduciary relationship existing prior to the
marriage. 310 In upholding the lower court's finding that a fiduciary relationship existed, the appellate court noted that the parties had been seeing each
other for seven years, that they were living together and were engaged, and
31
that they had agreed to purchase the property jointly. '
In Johnston v. Mabrey31 2 the ex-husband bought a home after divorce,
giving a down payment and a note for the remainder of the purchase price.
The ex-wife began living with him while they were still unmarried. The exhusband then executed a deed of the home to his ex-wife, who gave him a
check for his down payment and this amount was used to renovate the
house. The parties subsequently remarried. Several years later the wife
commenced a proceeding for divorce and claimed the house as her separate
property. The husband asserted that the property had been conveyed to her
as trustee for both of the parties and in the alternative sought reimbursement
for improvements. The trial court impressed a constructive trust on the
house and ordered a sale so that the proceeds might be divided equally.
On appeal the wife claimed that no confidential relationship existed to
support the constructive trust. The court stated that a confidential relation306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

694 S.W.2d at 649-50.
Andrews v. Andrews, 677 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id. at 173.

311. Id.at 174.
312. 677 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).
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ship may arise from moral, social, domestic, or personal relationships.3 13
Without recitation of particular facts the court held that evidence established the existence of a confidential relationship. 314 The constructive trust
315
was, therefore, upheld.
In Miller v. Miller 316 the husband and others formed an electronics corporation. After the husband had acquired stock in the corporation he
presented a shareholders' agreement to his wife for her signature. The agreement that the wife signed required in part that, in the event of divorce, the
wife offer to sell her shares to her husband. Following their divorce the wife
sought rescission of the agreement. The jury found that on the date of the
agreement the prospects of the corporation were promising, that a confidential relationship existed between the parties, and that the agreement was not
fair to the wife. 317 The trial court ruled that the divorce decree did not
dispose of the stock and that the parties, therefore, held the stock as tenants
in common. The trial court further ruled that the agreement was valid and
ordered the ex-wife to sell her shares to the ex-husband.
The court of appeals upheld the jury's findings relating to the confidential
relationship 31 8 and concluded that the husband had failed to discharge his
burden of proving the fairness of the agreement. 3 19 The court adopted a rule
imposing a fiduciary duty on a corporate officer or director to disclose
knowledge of special matters relating to the business. 320 The husband,
therefore, had a fiduciary duty to deal fairly with his wife in acquiring rights
in the stock. 32 1 Citing numerous Texas decisions 322 the court cast the burden of proving fairness upon the husband. 323 The court considered three
factors to determine the fairness of the agreement: (1) whether the fiduciary
made full disclosure, (2) whether the other party had independent advice,
and (3) the adequacy of the consideration. 324 Undisputed evidence established the lack of disclosure and independent advice. 325 With respect to the
third factor, the court held that the husband had failed to discharge his burden by failing to prove that he did not gain any benefit from the agreement at
313. Id. at 240 (citing Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. 1963)).
314. See id. at 240-41.
315. Id. at 241.
316. 700 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
317. Id. at 944.

318. Id. at 949. The opinion does not disclose whether this jury finding was based on the
director-stockholder relationship or the husband-wife relationship. The appellate court appears to base its decision on both relationships. See id. at 945.

319. Id. at 949.
320. Id. at 946 (citing Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431-34 (1909); Hobart v. Hobart
Estate Co., 26 Cal. 2d 412, 159 P.2d 958, 970 (1945)).

321. Id.
322. See Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Moore, 595 S.W.2d 502, 508-09 (Tex. 1980); Archer v.
Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739-40 (Tex. 1964); Johnson v. Peckham, 132 Tex. 148, 151-52, 120
S.W.2d 786, 787-88 (1938); Ginther v. Taub, 570 S.W.2d 516, 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco

1978, writ refd n.r.e.).
323. 700 S.W.2d at 946.
324. Id. at 947.
325. Id.
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his wife's expense. 326 The court, therefore, concluded327that the trial court
erred in denying the wife rescission of the agreement.
A fundamental question must be asked concerning Miller. Did the fiduciary relationship arise primarily from the marital relationship, that of community management, or that of corporate management? The court appears
to base its holding on the relationships in both the marital and business context, although the latter is given greater discussion in the court's opinion.
DividingAll the Property. In Odom v. Odom 328 the parties were divorced in
1967 under an orally-rendered divorce decree which failed to provide for a
property division. No written judgment was entered. In 1978 the ex-wife
obtained a judgment that purported to set aside the earlier decree and
awarded her "that portion of the retirement benefits to which she would be
entitled had the marriage continued until 1978."329 In 1982 the ex-wife sued
for a partition of the retirement benefits pursuant to the latter judgment, and
the ex-husband filed a bill of review to set aside the 1978 judgment. The trial
court entered judgment partitioning the benefits in accordance with findings
that the parties were divorced in 1967 and that the 1978 judgment was
330
void.
On appeal the San Antonio court affirmed the lower court's judgment,
holding that the marriage was properly dissolved in 1967 and that the trial
court correctly used the date of the 1967 judgment in calculating the community interest in the benefits. 33' The court noted that if a property division
is severed from the divorce for separate trial, the decree becomes interlocutory until the property is divided. 332 The court further noted, however, that
if a divorce decree merely fails to provide for division of property, the former
spouses become tenants in common with a right of partition.3 33 The record
contained nothing to indicate that the division of the parties' community
property had been severed from the divorce for separate trial. 334 The court,
therefore, concluded that the 1967 decree rendered the parties tenants in
common of their former community property and that the trial court prop326. Id. at 947-48.
327. Id. at 949. With difficulty the court disposed of the wife's admission at trial that, even
if she had been apprised of key facts regarding the agreement, she would have signed it anyway. See id. at 948-49. The ex-husband contended that the testimony negated both the materiality of the undisclosed facts and the causal relationship between the non-disclosure and the
damage to the wife. With respect to the first contention the court held that the husband had
failed to prove that knowledge of the facts would not have prevented the wife's signing, and
with respect to the second contention that the wife's testimony could not stand as an admission
that the breach of duty had no effect on her signing. Id.
328. 683 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ refd n.r.e.).
329. Id. at 136.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 137.
332. Id. (citing Vautrain v. Vautrain, 646 S.W.2d 309, 315-16 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ dism'd); Underhill v. Underhill, 614 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
333. Id. (citing Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970); Taylor v. Catalon, 140
Tex. 38, 41-42, 166 S.W.2d 102, 104 (1943)).
334. Id.
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erly employed the date of the earlier decree in calculating the community
335
interest in the benefits.
The court's analysis has serious flaws. First, no judgment was ever entered in the 1967 suit.3 36 Although the divorce appears to have been granted
orally, the entry of a judgment was nonetheless required. In Dunn v.
Dunn, 337 relied upon by the court in Odom, the issue before the court was
whether a judgment could be entered pursuant to a prior oral rendition after
the death of one of the parties. 338 There the court dealt only with the question of whether the surviving wife was entitled to have her motion to dismiss
sustained prior to entry of the written judgment. In contrast neither party in
Odom appears to have been concerned to complete the 1967 proceedings.
Second, the trial court did not merely fail to divide some of the property;
none of the property was divided in 1967. Hence, a final judgment could not
be entered in the 1967 suit, and it should have been treated as a nullity.
PropertyNot Subject to Division. In Taylor v. Taylor 339 the ex-husband borrowed money for his own use or at his direction from an account containing
funds belonging to his minor children. On divorce the trial court concluded
that it did not have jurisdiction to order the ex-husband to repay the
money. 34° On appeal the court reversed and remanded that portion of the
lower court decision. 34 1 The court noted the presumption to the effect that a
debt created by a spouse during marriage is an obligation of the community. 342 The court went on to say that pursuant to section 3.63(a) of the
Family Code343 a trial court has authority to order the payment or disposition of community debts in its division of the community estate. 344 The
court, therefore, concluded that the trial court had jurisdiction to order the
345
repayment of the ex-husband's debt.
A trial court in its discretion is permitted to award one party an interest in
a partnership, but not in specific partnership property when the other exspouse and a third party are partners. 346 Thus, in Jones v. Jones34 7 the trial
335. Id.
336. Id. at 136.
337. 430 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969).
338. See id. at 831-32.
339. 680 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
340. Id. at 647-48.
341. Id. at 650.
342. Id. at 648 (citing Mortenson v. Trammell, 604 S.W.2d 269, 275 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
343. Section 3.63(a) provides that "In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall
order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right,
having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
344. 680 S.W.2d at 648.
345. Id. Joined with the suit for divorce was, of course, a separate suit to protect the
interest of the minor children of the marriage. If the husband had squandered their money,
they were capable of appealing an adverse ruling. Why their representative failed to assert
their interest is not revealed.
346. Jones v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ).
347. Id.
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court erred in awarding the wife money in a partnership checking account
maintained by the husband and a third person and requiring the husband to
encumber his interest in the partnership with an obligation to pay the wife a
money judgment. 348 Such awards were not within the discretion of the trial
court despite the fact that the husband's interest in the partnership was part
349
of the community estate.
In Whorrall v. Whorral1350 the trial court determined that the husband
owned as his separate property .009 of the parties' home as a result of a
small initial contribution of his separate property toward the purchase of the
home. The court nevertheless awarded the wife all of the husband's separate
interest in the home along with all of the community interest in that property. 35 1 The Austin Court of Appeals held that a trial court has no authority
to divest a spouse of a fee interest of separate realty, although requiring the
wife to maintain a tenancy in common with a .009 interest was economically
unrealistic and impracticable. 352 The court, therefore, concluded that the
divestiture was not harmless error and plainly caused the rendition of an
353
improper judgment.
Division on Remand. An appellate court remanded a division of property to
a divorce court, and the former wife sought discovery relating to acquisitions
of the former husband after the decree of divorce. The court quashed her
notice to take a deposition, and the ex-wife brought a proceeding for a writ
of mandamus to force the trial court to accede to her request. The writ was
denied. 354 The couple was already divorced, the remand did not have the
effect of extending their marital status for purposes of property division, and
the facts sought for discovery were, therefore, irrelevant to the remanded
3 55
proceeding.
Reimbursement. In Anderson v. Gilliland356 a community mortgage was
used to finance a significant part of residential construction on the wife's
separate property. After the husband's death, his heir claimed that the community was due reimbursement for the enhanced value of the improvements,
less half of the mortgage still owing. The court of appeals held that when
both cost and enhanced value have been proved, the lesser of the two is the
proper measure of reimbursement to the community. 35 7 The lesser amount
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. 691 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ dism'd). A portion of the opinion discusses questions of characterization and is treated supra notes 47-58, 92-95 and accompanying
text.
351. 691 S.W.2d at 34.
352. Id. at 36-37.
353. Id. at 37.
354. Gordon v. Blackmon, 675 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ).
355. Id. at 793-94.
356. 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985).
357. 677 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984), affd in part and rev'd in part, 684
S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985).
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in this instance was cost. The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that
measuring reimbursement by cost alone would enrich the benefited estate at
the expense of the contributing estate, and the measure of the lesser of cost
or enhancement would consistently give the benefited estate the best of all
situations.3 58 The court termed this result inequitable and, therefore, held
that a claim for reimbursement should be measured by enhancement in
value. 3 5 9 The court thus awarded one-half of the enhanced value to the de360
cedent's estate, less one-half the mortgage remaining unpaid.
On careful consideration the argument based on inequity seems misconceived. Receipt of benefits by a separate estate at the expense of the community estate can occur in three commonly-experienced ways. The non-owner
spouse may use the community for the benefit of the other spouse's separate
property, a spouse may use community property for the benefit of his own
estate with the knowledge of the other spouse, or a spouse may so benefit his
separate estate without knowledge of the other spouse. The last case is least
common, and when it occurs in a fraudulent context a post-divorce action
for damages may be available. 36 ' The other two situations are more com-

monly encountered: the community estate is used by a spouse for the benefit
of the separate property of either spouse with full knowledge of the other
spouse. Hypothetically, each spouse is, therefore, in the position to suggest
that the advancement should be made with payment of interest. In my judgment such a suggestion by the "lending spouse" is almost certain to be met
with outrage on the part of the other. Hence, for the law to award the value
of enhancement in the separate property to which the advancement contributed is equally outrageous. Thus, the law seems prepared to impose terms to
which spouses in ordinary conditions would not have agreed.
In Anderson the Texas Supreme Court relied in part 362 on the 1983 decision of the Fort Worth court in Cook v. Cook 363 in concluding that enhancement in value in the measure of reimbursement for community funds
expended to improve separate property. 364 In Cook the husband had
purchased real property prior to marriage. 365 During the marriage community funds were spent on improving the property. On remand the trial court,
in accordance with Anderson, again ordered reimbursement measured by enhancement in value, and the ex-husband appealed to the Fort Worth court a
second time. On this appeal the husband contested the trial court's measure
of reimbursement, distinguishing Anderson on the basis that the present appeal concerned the division of marital property on divorce, whereas Ander358. Id. at 675.
359. Id.
360. Id. For a preliminary discussion of Anderson see McKnight, Family Law: Husband
and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J. 1, 11-13 (1985).
361. See Logan v. Barge, 568 S.W.2d 863, 870-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, writ

ref'd n.r.e.).
362. 684 S.W.2d at 675.
363. 665 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.), affd on remand, 693
S.W.2d 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
364. 684 S.W.2d at 674-75.
365. Cook v. Cook, 693 S.W.2d 785, 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
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son involved the probate of a will.3 66 The Court nevertheless concluded that
the language and reasoning of Anderson were applicable to a property division on divorce, noting further that the supreme court in its decision had
3 67
relied in part upon the first appeal of the present case.
In Jones v. Jones368 the court considered the community's right to reimbursement due to enhancement of the husband separate business interests.
The husband and his brother were the primary managing and operating officers of a business, as well as the only common stockholders. The court
found that during the marriage the husband's salary was far below an
amount commensurate to his actual worth to the business and ample funds
369 Under Jensen v. Jensen370
were available to pay for the services rendered.
the community is entitled to reimbursement for the value of time and effort
expended by either or both spouses to enhance the separate estate of either,
excluding that reasonably necessary to preserve the separate estate. 371 This
amount is reduced by any compensation received for that time and effort in
the form of salary, bonuses, and dividends. 372 Under this principle the court
held in Jones that the community estate was entitled to reimbursement for
its enhancement in the amount by which the husband's salary was
373
inadequate.
Exercise of Discretion. A trial court has broad discretion in making an appropriate division of community property on divorce. 374 Such a division will
375
not be disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
Further, an appellate court may not merely substitute its discretion for that
366. Id. at 786.

367. Id.
368. 699 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ).
369. Id. at 586.
370. 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984).
371. Id. at 110.
372. Id. For extensive discussion of Jensen see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and
Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 137-39 (1984); McKnight, Reimbursement for Uncompensated Labor Rendered for a Closely-Held Corporation, 3 ST. B. LIT. SEC.
REP.: THE ADVOCATE, December 1984, at 8-14.

373. 699 S.W.2d at 586.
374. The Texas Family Code gives the trial court broad latitude in making a division that is
"just and right." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986); see Tarin v. Tarin,
605 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); McKibben v. McKibben, 567
S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1978, no writ); Comment, Division of Marital
Property on Divorce: What Does the Court Deem "Just and Right?", 19 Hous. L. REV. 503,
503-25 (1982). A trial court is presumed to have exercised its discretion properly. Jones v.
Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ). A trial court in its discretion may disregard a jury's answers to special issues concerning the division of the marital
estate, because such answers are advisory only. Barker v. Barker, 688 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex.
App.--Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
375. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); McKnight v. McKnight, 543
S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976); Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 173 (Tex. 1975);
Patt v. Patt, 689 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ); Hardin v.
Hardin, 681 S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ); see also authorities
cited in McKnight, Family Law.-Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 39 Sw. L.J.
1, 32 n.299 (1985). In Earp v. Earp, 688 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no
writ), the court held that abuse of discretion is not a proper subject for a bill of review. The
court stated that the ex-wife had failed to show a prima facie meritorious defense to her ex-
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of the trial court, in that a just and right division is a matter lying solely
within the discretion of the trial court. 376 Community property need not be
divided equally, but the court must have some reasonable basis for decreeing
an unequal division. 377 Among the factors that a court may look to in making an unequal division of community property are the relative earning capacities and business experience of the parties, the size of the respective
separate estates, and the fault of either party in the breakdown of the
378
marriage.
When a court of appeals finds reversible error which materially affects the
trial court's just and right division of the property, it must remand the division of the entire community estate. 379 Hence in Jacobs v. Jacobs38 0 the
Texas Supreme Court reversed an appellate court's decision that limited remand to specific properties. 38' In Jacobs the court of appeals had ruled that
the trial court erred in characterizing certain property as separate or community and had struck certain reimbursement awards but had affirmed other
portions of the lower court's division. 382 The court of appeals had remanded
for a new division only that portion of the cause that affected the mischaracterized property. 383 The Texas Supreme Court held that a court of
appeals must remand the entire community estate for a new division when it
384
finds reversible error which materially affects the trial court's division.
The court also reiterated its holding in McKnight v. McKnight385 that an
appellate court must not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court
with regard to the trial court's just and right division of the community
estate. 386 Under McKnight the appelate court is required to remand the entire property division rather than excise reimbursement claims from the divi3 87
sion and remand as to specific properties only.
husband's alleged wrongful acts, after having grounded her plea for relief on the trial court's
unequal division of the community estate. Id. at 247-48.
376. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985); McKnight v. McKnight, 543
S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. 1976).
377. Patt v. Patt, 689 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ);
Tarin v. Tarin, 605 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1980, no writ); Zamora v.
Zamora, 611 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, no writ).
378. Murffv. Murf, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Jones v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 585
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ); Patt v. Patt, 689 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ); Padon v. Padon, 670 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, no writ). For material discussing the equitable distribution of marital property see Annot., 41 A.L.R.4th 481, 484-522 (1985).
379. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985).
380. 687 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1985).
381. Id. at 733.
382. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 669 S.W.2d 759, 762-66 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984),
rev'd, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985).
383. Id. at 763.
384. 687 S.W.2d at 732. The court pronounces the standard twice in the opinion. See id.
at 733. The second statement of the standard omits the word "materially." Id.
385. 543 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976) (appeals court erred in rendering specific awards of
property rather than remanding, after determination that the trial court had abused its
discretion).
386. 687 S.W.2d at 732 (citing McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 867 (Tex. 1976)).
387. Id.
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In Patt v. Patt388 the trial court awarded the wife the exclusive use of the
parties' home for life and awarded each spouse a one-half interest in the
home at that time. 38 9 When the parties were divorced four of the parties'
adult children were living with the wife. 390 On appeal the husband argued
that the trial court's division was manifestly unjust and unfair.3 9 1 Declining
392
to find an abuse of discretion, the court of appeals affirmed the division.

The appellate court concluded that the trial court was concerned primarily
with the wife's ability to support herself and noted that the house provided
the ex-wife with current income in the form of rents collected from her chil393
dren or from others.
An appeals court may decline to find an abuse of discretion when the
record does not contain specific findings of fact regarding the value of all
items of community property. 394 Thus, in Jones v. Jones395 the court rejected the contention of the husband that the trial court abused its discretion
3 96
in awarding to him only fourteen percent of the community property.
The court stated that it was incumbent upon the husband to request additional findings of fact 397 that would have established the specific values of
community assets and liabilities considered by the trial court. 398 The court
further stated that any "omitted unrequested elements" 399 supported by evi4
dence would be supplied by a presumption in support of the judgment. 00
The court, therefore, declined to find an abuse of discretion in the lower
40 1
court's property division.
On the other hand, in Andrews v. Andrews 40 2 the husband contended that
the ultimate division of the community estate of the parties was substantially
388. 689 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1985, no writ).
389. Id. at 506, 508.
390. Id. at 507.

391. Id. at 506.
392. Id. at 508.
393. Id. The court also noted that the husband's equity in the home would be increased by
the wife's monthly mortgage payments. Id.
Similarly the San Antonio court noted the parties disparate income-earning potential in declining to find an abuse of discretion in the trial court's division. Hardin v. Hardin, 681
S.W.2d 241, 243 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ). The appellate court held that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award the wife an interest in her husband's
retirement benefits and remarked that at the time of the trial the husband was 67 and retired,
while the wife was 60 and receiving income. Id. In Schuster v. Schuster, 690 S.W.2d 644
(Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ), the court declined to hold that the lower court had abused
its discretion in ordering an unequal division, noting that the party receiving the lesser portion
had more formal education, greater earning capacity, and a larger separate estate than the
other spouse. Id. at 645.
394. Jones v. Jones, 699 S.W.2d 583, 585-86 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ).

395. Id.
396. Id. at 586.
397. TEX. R. Civ. P. 298 permits either party to request of the trial judge further, additional, or amended findings of fact. If the court declines to give them, however, the party may
be without a further practicable remedy.
398. 699 S.W.2d at 585.
399. TEX. R. Civ. P. 299.
400. 699 S.W.2d at 586 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 299).
401. Id.
402. 677 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
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unequal in favor of the wife. The wife defended the division on the ground
that the husband had wasted, mismanaged, or converted community funds.
The court held that, although the husband had made some poor investments
of community funds, he had acted in good faith, and no fraud on the community had been demonstrated with respect to his diversion of property to
his mother. 40 3 The case was remanded for a redivision of the community
404
estate.
One of the Houston courts of appeals reversed the lower court's division
on the grounds of abuse of discretion. In Welch v. Welch 40 5 the trial court
had awarded the wife a net share of the community property worth approximately $93,000 and had awarded the husband property that was subject to
debts exceeding the value of the assets by approximately $23,000.406 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that the division of the community property was clearly inequitable. 40 7 The court noted that, although the husband
had received more education than his wife and also received income from
certain separate real property, the husband's business was burdened with a
substantial amount of debt and the husband passed on the income from the
real property to his mother as her sole source of support. 40 8 Hence, the
court concluded that the evidence might have justified an award of a greater
portion of the community estate to the wife, but that the court could not find
support for the lower court's grossly unequal division, which constituted a
clear abuse of discretion. 40 9
Military Retirement Benefits. In McCarty v. McCarty4 10 the United States
Supreme Court ruled on June 26, 1981, that nondisability military retire4 11
ment benefits were not divisible as community property by state courts.
Because the decision has not been given retroactive effect, 41 2 an ex-spouse
divorced under a final, unappealed divorce decree entered prior to the date
of decision was not permitted to suspend payments of benefits to his exspouse. 4 13 An issue was also raised with respect to suits to partition retire-

ment benefits not disposed of under a pre-McCarty decree. 4 14 In Trahan v.
403. Id. at 175.
404. Id. at 175-76.
405. Welch v. Welch, 694 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
406. Id. at 375-76.

407. Id. at 376.
408. Id.

409. Id. at 377.
410. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).

411. Id. at 233.
412. Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (Tex.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 242, 78 L.
Ed. 2d 232 (1983); see McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131, 140-41 (1984); see also authorities cited id. at 163 n.278 (decisions of
Texas intermediate appellate courts resolving the issue under the doctrine of res judicata). But

see Exparte Acree, 623 S.W.2d 810, 811-12 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ) (permitting collateral attack on pre-McCarty final decree by habeas corpus proceeding).
413. Segrest v. Segrest, 649 S.W.2d 610, 612-13 (Tex. 1983).
414. See McKnight, Family Law: Husbandand Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 37 Sw.

L.J. 65, 100-01 (1983).
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Trahan4 1 5 the Texas Supreme Court refused to permit a division of military
retirement benefits left undivided on divorce. 4 16 The court noted that the
case was on appeal at the time McCarty was decided and concluded that
McCarty precluded any further division of the benefits because no final judgment on the merits had been rendered. 41 7 Then Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA),4 18 authorizing
state courts to divide military pension benefits on divorce in accordance with
state community property law. 4 19 The Act applies to funds payable after
June 25, 1981,420 and thus Congress apparently intended that McCarty have
42 1
no effect in subsequent cases.
All military retirement benefits that accrue during marriage are community property. 422 In reversing McCarty the USFSPA permits state courts to
divide even those benefits that vested while McCarty was in effect and which
arguably are separate property. 4 23 Hence, in Jackson v. Green424 the Corpus
Christi court noted that a trial court may award benefits for pay periods
beginning after June 25, 1981 and thus affirmed the trial court's award of a
lump sum for the ex-wife's interest in the benefits from that date until the
42 5
date of the partition suit.
In Workings v. Workings4 26 the husband had been receiving military retirement benefits when the parties were divorced in 1968. The divorce decree stated that the parties had already divided their community property
but did not state how they had divided it. The husband continued to receive
all retirement benefits. The parties later remarried, and the second breakdown of their marriage was before the court. At trial, testimony of the
415.

626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981).

416. Id. at 488.
417. Id. at 487-88.
418. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982) (effective Feb. 1, 1983).
419. Id. § 1408(c)(1).
420. Id.
421. For background discussion of McCarty and the USFSPA, see generally Newton &
Trail, Uninformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act-A Legislative Answer to the McCarty Problem, 46 TEX. B.J. 291, 291-307 (1983); Reppy, Reconsidering the Rules for Military
Benefits, 5 FAM. ADVOC., Spring 1983, at 30-35, 40; Sampson & Friday, McCarty Redux:
Construing the Uniformed Services FormerSpouses' ProtectionAct, 82-3 ST. B. SEC. REP. FAM.
L., Fall 1982, at 7-12; Note, Closing the McCarty-USFSPA Window: A Proposalfor Relief
from McCarty Era Final Judgments, 63 TEX. L. REV. 497, 497-531 (1984). For material
discussing the Act with reference to the laws of other jurisdictions, see Comment, The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: A Partial Return of Power, 11 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 71, 77-83 (1983) (California); Comment, McCartyism in New Mexico: McCarty v. McCarty and the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 13 N.M.L. REV. 665, 665-86
(1983) (New Mexico).
422. See Ex parte Burson, 615 S.W.2d 192, 193-94 (Tex. 1981); Cearley v. Cearley, 544
S.W.2d 661, 662 (Tex. 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975).
423. See Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Tex. 1982); Vines v. Vines, 683
S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ). In Vines the court concluded that if
the USFSPA truly reversed McCarty, then courts should be able to divide retirement benefits
regardless of McCarty. Id. But see Smith v. Smith, 694 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1985, no writ) (McCarty satisfied condition subsequent in order clarifying divorce
decree, thus relieving ex-husband of duty to pay benefits despite passage of USFSPA).
424. 700 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
425. Id. at 623.
426. 700 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
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spouses conflicted as to how the parties agreed to divide the retirement benefits prior to the first divorce. 427 The trial court made no specific finding as to
that agreement but nevertheless declared that the retirement benefits were
community property and divided them. 428 On appeal the husband claimed
the retirement benefits as separate property under the earlier property agreement. The Dallas Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for
a determination of the 9division made in 1968 and to deal with the retirement
42
benefits accordingly.
A recurring issue with regard to military retirement benefits has been the
proper procedure for obtaining a post-divorce division of benefits. Community property not divided on divorce is held by the former spouses as tenants
in common. 4 30 As such the proper means for dividing such benefits is a suit
for partition. 4 3' If the decree is silent as to the benefits, such relief is generally available. 43 2 On the other hand, when benefits have been expressly disposed of by a final divorce decree, a demand for a portion of the benefits
amounts to a collateral attack on the judgment, and the courts are less willing to grant relief.4 33 Hence, in Allison v. Allison 434 the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's holding that retirement benefits expressly
awarded to the ex-husband under the divorce decree rendered during the
period after McCarty and before the effective date of the USFSPA are not
subject to later division. 435 Similarly, in Breen v. Breen436 the parties were
divorced in June of 1982, and the husband was awarded all military retirement benefits pursuant to McCarty. After passage of the USFSPA the exwife brought suit to partition the military retirement benefits, arguing that
USFSPA retroactively alters prior final divorce decrees. The ex-husband responded by pleading res judicata as to the divorce decree. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the USFSPA does not give Texas courts the
power to modify post-McCarty final judgments which had specifically
437
awarded the retirement benefits.
438
In O'Connor v. O'Connor, however, the San Antonio court upheld a
427. Id. at 253. The parties' partition agreement appears to have been oral. The court said
that at the time of the final divorce in 1968 an oral partition was valid, id. at 254, citing Loston
v. Loston, 424 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ dism'd), and
Nelson v. Geit, 314 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1958, writ dism'd).
428. 700 S.W.2d at 253.
429. Id. at 254.
430. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
431. See Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex. 1977); Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d
551, 554-55 (Tex. 1970); Keller v. Keller, 135 Tex. 260, 267, 141 S.W.2d 308, 311 (1940).
432. See Harrell v. Harrell, 692 S.W.2d 876, 876 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).
433. See Allison v. Allison, 700 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1985).
434. 700 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1985).
435. Id. at 915 (citing Constance v. Constance, 544 S.W.2d 659, 660-61 (Tex. 1976)).
436. 693 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref d n.r.e.).
437. Id. at 498. The court further rejected the ex-wife's argument that its holding would
have the harsh effect of punishing her for not appealing the divorce decree when McCarty
would have foreclosed such an appeal. Id. In dismissing the ex-wife's claim the court noted
that divorce decrees are particularly in need of finality. Id. (citing Ex parte Havermale, 636
S.W.2d 828, 836 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ)).
438. 694 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
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lower court's partition that awarded the ex-wife a portion of her ex-husband's benefits received by him after the parties' post-McCarty, pre-USFSPA
divorce. 4 39 The court set forth two guidelines to govern the availability of
partition in such cases. First, the court noted that the decision to permit
partition may turn on whether the suit would constitute a direct or a collateral attack on the divorce decree. 440 Second, the court stated that if the
decree is final a court should look to whether the decree is silent or explicit

with respect to the division of benefits. 4" 1 In the case before it the court
found language in the decree expressly disclaiming disposition of benefits
442
and, therefore, affirmed the lower court's partition.
In two other cases 44 3 the San Antonio court also held that military retirement benefits not divided on divorce were owned by the ex-spouses as tenants in common. Because McCarty was in effect 44 4 the retirement benefits
could not be divided as community property at the time of divorce. Once
the USFSPA was passed, however, the effect of McCarty was reversed, and
Texas law applied to the benefits. 44 5 Thus, in each case a partition suit could
be entertained.

446

One of the more difficult issues relating to the apportionment of retirement benefits stems from unapportioned increases in benefits arising after
divorce. In 1983 the Texas Supreme Court held in Berry v. Berry4 4 7 that
when a spouse retires after divorce and receives retirement benefits, the benefits are apportioned to the spouses on the basis of the value of the community
interest in the pension upon divorce. 448 Moreover, a division of those bene439. Id. at 155.
440. Id. at 154. The courts of appeals generally permit trial courts to reconsider division of
retirement benefits when an ex-spouse directly attacks a divorce decree. See Patino v. Patino,
687 S.W.2d 799, 802-03 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ); Voronin v. Voronin, 662
S.W.2d 102, 106-07 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, writ dism'd); Gordon v. Gordon, 659 S.W.2d
475, 478-79 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1983, no writ).
441. 694 S.W.2d at 154. Final divorce decrees with no specific designation as to the retirement benefits may be subject to collateral attack. See Harkrider v. Morales, 686 S.W.2d 712,
715 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ) (partition suit); Harrell v. Harrell, 684 S.W.2d
118, 123-24 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (bill of review); Trahan v. Trahan, 682
S.W.2d 332, 334 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, writ refd n.r.e.) (partition suit). If the divorce
decree expressly awards the retirement benefits, then res judicata bars any subsequent division
of the benefits. See Breen v. Breen, 693 S.W.2d 495, 498 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref d n.r.e.).
442. 694 S.W.2d at 155.
443. Forsman v. Forsman, 694 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Harkrider v. Morales, 686 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
444. Both the Forsman and the Harkrider divorces were granted in September, 1981. In
Trahan v. Trahan, 626 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. 1981), the Texas Supreme Court construed McCarty
to hold that the federal supremacy clause foreclosed the division of military retirement benefits
under Texas community property law. Id. at 487.
445. Forsman, 694 S.W.2d at 114; Harkrider,686 S.W.2d at 714.
446. 694 S.W.2d at 114 (citing Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554-55 (Tex. 1970)); 686
S.W.2d at 715.
447. 647 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1983).
448. Id. at 947. In Berry the husband retired 12 years after the divorce from a position that
he had held during his marriage. The ex-wife brought a partition suit to recover a share of the
benefits received upon the ex-husband's retirement but undivided on divorce. The Texas
Supreme Court held the ex-wife entitled to one-half of the amount that the husband would
have received had he retired at the date of divorce. Id. at 946-47. For discussions of Berry see
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fits must be based on the spouse's rank attained at the time of divorce. 44 9
In Harrellv. Harrel14 50 the ex-wife challenged the trial court's finding that
any post-divorce increases in the ex-husband's retirement benefits were not
subject to partition. In support of the trial court's holding the ex-husband
argued that Berry prohibits an award of post-divorce increases in retirement
benefits to the extent the ex-husband's post-divorce labor contributed to
those increases. 45 1 The court of appeals distinguished Berry, however, since
the increases in the case before it did not result from the ex-husband's postdivorce efforts. 45 2 Thus, an award to the ex-wife of one-half of the postdivorce increases in the ex-husband's retirement benefits did not invade the
453
ex-husband's separate property.
Islamic Divorce. In the past Texas courts have usually relied on the law of
the place where an event occurred in order to determine its legal consequences. 45 4 For the validity of divorce the law of the domicile of the parties
was usually controlling. 4 55 In Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co.4 56 the Texas
Supreme Court adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws 4 57 as the prevailing principle for choice
of law purposes. In Seth v. Seth 45 8 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held
that for determining the validity of a prior foreign divorce of foreign nationals later domiciled in Texas, a Texas court properly looks to the "policies" of
the law of Texas. 459 In Seth a second wife sued her husband for divorce, and
the first wife intervened to contest the validity of the second marriage. The
trial court denied the divorce on the ground that a subsisting prior marriage
existed, and the petitioner appealed. The husband and his first wife had been
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 38 Sw. L.J. 131,
141-42 (1984); Comment, An InterdisciplinaryAnalysis of the Division of Pension Benefits in
Divorce and Post-Judgment PartitionActions: Cures for the Inequities in Berry v. Berry, 37
BAYLOR L. REV. 107, 107-79 (1985); Note, Berry v. Berry: Valuation of Retirement Benefits in
the Omitted Property Case, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 895, 895-902 (1983). In Brown v. Robertson, 606 F.
Supp. 494 (W.D. Tex. 1985), a federal court said by way of obiter dictum that retirement
benefits to be paid after divorce but earned during marriage are community property and a
contingent interest that will vest upon receipt. Thus a trial court has jurisdiction under TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon Supp. 1986) to divide benefits not yet in existence. 606 F.
Supp. at 497.
449. See Berry v. Berry, 647 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1983); Rankin v. Bateman, 686 S.W.2d
707, 710 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Jackson v. Green, 700
S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (burden on spouse receiving benefits to prove rank at the time of divorce).
450. 700 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
451. In Berry the court found that the increase in retirement benefits occurred as a result of
post-divorce labor and union contract negotiations. The court found that the increased benefits were the ex-husband's separate property which could not be awarded to the ex-wife. Berry,
647 S.W.2d at 947.
452. 700 S.W.2d at 648.
453. Id. (citing Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. 1982)).
454. See Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 313-18 (Tex. 1979).
455. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976,
no writ).
456. 665 S.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Tex. 1984).
457. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).
458. 694 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
459. Id. at 462.
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non-Moslem Indian nationals. After forming a liaison with his second wife
and long before their arrival in Texas, the husband and his prospective
spouse converted to Islam in India, and a year later the husband divorced
the first wife in Kuwait. "This divorce was rendered through a summary, ex
parte procedure known as talak ....

[T]he divorce was rendered when

husband pronounced three times: 'I divorce you.' "460 The first wife had no
notice of this apparently formal, though private, act. The following day the
husband was married to the petitioner in Kuwait.
The appellate court upheld the trial court's judgment on the ground that
allowing a non-Moslem to embrace Islam by a short verbal phrase and then
to divorce his wife was so harsh to the non-Moslem wife as to be contrary to
"our notions of good morals and natural justice." ' 46 ' The court, therefore,
declined to apply Islamic law. 462 The court also noted that the divorce did
not seem to have been sanctioned by a proper state body of Kuwait and thus
was apparently looked upon as a non-governmental act.46 3 The court did
not discuss the domicile of the husband at the time of the first divorce.
Although a growing body of literature is available 464 on the institution of
the talak as practiced with some degree of difference in various Moslem
countries, the court mentioned none of this material, and the decision does
not add much, if anything, to an appreciation or solution of the problems
that arise in connection with the validity of a talak when called into question
in a Texas court.
Enforcement. The 1983 statutory provisions setting out the rules for enforcement of divorce decrees 46 5 have been somewhat clarified and explained
in recent decisions. In Ex parte Goad4 66 the ex-wife filed three separate motions for contempt seeking to enforce payments of her ex-husband's military
retirement benefits awarded her under a divorce decree. The motions differed from one another only in the amount claimed. Only the first of these
motions was filed prior to the effective date467 of section 3.70 of the Family
Code, which provides in part that motions to enforce the division of future
property must be filed within two years after the right to the property ma460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Id. at 461.
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id.
See K. AHMAD,

MUSLIM LAW OF DIVORCE

JAYME, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

28-35 (1978); 2 A.

EHRENZWEIG

& E.

172-73 (1973); Anderson, Modern Trends in Islam:

Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East, 20 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1, 7-8 (1971);
Carroll, A "Bare" Talaq is Not a Divorce Obtainedby "Other Proceedings," 101 LAW Q. REV.
170, 170-75 (1985); Carroll, The PakistaniTalaq in English Law: Ex parte Minhas and Quazi
v. Quazi, 2 ISLAMIC & COMP. L.Q. 17, 17-37 (1982); Herzog, Conflict of Laws, 26 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 9, 25-26 (1975); Hill, Recognition of the "Bare" Talaq: The Last Word?, 15 FAM. L.
290, 290-91 (1985); McEwan, TransnationalDivorce, 129 SOLIC. J. 214, 214-15 (1985).
465. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.70-.77 (Vernon Supp. 1986); enacted as Act of June 17,
1983, ch. 424, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2346, 2350-53.
466. 690 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. 1985).
467. Subchapter D became effective on September 1, 1983. Act of June 17, 1983, ch. 424,
§ 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2346, 2350-53, 2361.
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tures or the decree becomes final, whichever is later. 468 The trial court ren-

dered a judgment of contempt and ordered the ex-husband to pay a lump
sum representing withheld benefits. 469 In presenting his writ of habeas
corpus 470 to the Texas Supreme Court, the ex-husband contended that the

lower court was without authority to order the payment of the sum because
it was barred by the two-years limitations period of section 3.70.471 The
supreme court held, however, that the limitations period did not bar the suit
for contempt. 472 The court noted that section 3.70(b) provides that enforcement proceedings "shall be as in civil cases generally. ' 473 The court, therefore, reasoned that Article 5539b, 474 which provides that certain
amendments to pleadings shall not be subject to a plea of limitation when the
original pleading was not thereby affected, was applicable to contempt proceedings to compel payment of retirement benefits. 4 75 The court concluded
that the ex-wife's third motion for contempt did not allege a "wholly new,
distinct or different transaction and occurrence, ' 476 and thus her motion
was not barred by the two-years limitations period of section 3.70.*77
A number of decisions of the Texas courts of appeals dealt with procedural and substantive issues arising out of motions in aid or clarification of a
decree. 478 In Brannon v. Brannon 479 the ex-wife filed a partition suit seeking
an accounting and a partition of her ex-husband's military retirement benefits, which had not been divided under the parties' divorce decree. The trial
court entered judgment awarding the ex-wife a portion of the retirement
480
benefits. Two years later the ex-wife filed a motion in aid of judgment,
seeking to clarify the partition to take into account future cost of living increases. The trial court granted the motion, and the ex-husband appealed. 48 1
468.
section,
S.W.2d
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(c) (Vernon Supp. 1986). Prior to the enactment of this
motions to enforce division of future property were governed by Huff v. Huff, 648
286 (Tex. 1983).
690 S.W.2d at 895-96.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 475.
690 S.W.2d at 896.
Id.
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5539b (Vernon 1958).

475. 690 S.W.2d at 897.
476. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5539b (Vernon 1958).

477. 690 S.W.2d at 897.
A similar issue confronted the court of appeals in Perkins v. Perkins, 690 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). There the court rejected the argument of the ex-husband that the lower court had no authority to enforce payments of retirement benefits to his
ex-wife under the new enforcement provisions because the decree was rendered before the
effective date of those provisions. Id. at 708. The court stated that it found no language within
the enforcement provisions which limited their applicability to judgments rendered after the
effective date, noting that all payments enforced by the lower court arose after the effective
date. Id.
478. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.72 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
479. 692 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
480. The Family Code limits orders entered to enforce the property division to orders in
aid or clarification of the prior order. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.71(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
The Code permits a court to issue a clarifying order on a finding that the original form of the
division of property is not sufficiently specific to be enforceable by contempt. Id. § 3.72(b).
481. 692 S.W.2d at 529.
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The Dallas Court of Appeals held that such a motion is an impermissible
procedure for clarification of a prior judgment obtained in a partition suit
subsequent to divorce. 48 2 The court cited subsection 3.70(d) 48 3 of the Family Code, which expressly excludes from the scope of Subchapter D existing
property not divided on divorce. 48 4 The court, therefore, vacated the lower
court's judgment and entered an order dismissing the ex-wife's motion in aid
48 5
of judgment.
Subchapter D permits a trial court to issue an order in aid or clarification
of a judgment upon a finding that the division of property is not specific
enough to be enforced by contempt. 48 6 Section 3.71(a), however, expressly
forbids a court from using such an order to alter or change the substantive
division of the property. 487 This restriction is in accordance with prior
48 9
law. 48 8 Two decisions considered a trial court's authority in this respect.
490
In In re Allen
the parties had entered into a property settlement agree49 1
ment
that set aside to the husband all personal property in his control.
The agreement was subsequently incorporated in the divorce decree, and the
court ordered the parties to execute instruments necessary to effect its terms.
About six weeks after the judgment was no longer subject to modification by
the court, it was realized that the property settlement failed to make reference to a specific piece of realty. The ex-husband moved for enforcement of
the decree. Because the realty was acquired to be sold to a partnership of
which the ex-husband was a partner, 492 he argued that the realty was partnership property. He further argued that because his partnership interest
was personalty and because it was in his control, the agreement incorporated
in the decree actually disposed of the realty under its terms. The trial court
accepted his argument and ordered the ex-wife to convey the realty to her
ex-husband. On appeal the Amarillo court reversed, holding that the clarification order amounted to a modification of the divorce decree. 49 3 The court
noted that resolution of the problem required a determination whether the
realty was partnership property and that a construction of the property settlement agreement was necessary. 494 The trial court lacked authority to re482. Id. at 530.
483. Subsection 3.70(d) provides that "The procedures and limitations provided by this
subchapter do not apply to existing property not divided on divorce and thereby held by the
ex-spouses as tenants in common. A suit for partition of that property is governed by the rules
applicable to civil cases generally." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.70(d) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
484. 692 S.W.2d at 530.
485. Id.
486. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.72(b) (Vernon Supp. 1986).
487. Id. § 3.71(a).
488. See McGehee v. Epley, 661 S.W.2d 924, 925 (Tex. 1983); Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520
S.W.2d 881, 888 (Tex. 1975); Harris v. Harris, 679 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984,
writ dism'd).
489. In re Allen, 692 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ); Bjornson v. Corbitt, 690 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
490. 692 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, no writ).
491. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
492. 692 S.W.2d at 113-14.
493. Id. at 116.
494. Id.
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solve these issues under a section 3.70 motion.4 95
In Bjornson v. Corbitt4 9 6 attorneys for the ex-wife in a suit for divorce
brought a petition in intervention to collect attorney's fees, alleging an indebtedness on the part of the ex-wife and the former community estate. The
petition was filed almost a year after the judgment of divorce had been
and awarded the attorneys a
signed. The court granted the intervention
497
judgment against the former spouses.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded. 498 The court held that when
thirty days from the date of the judgment had expired, the judgment became
final, 49 9 and the lower court lost authority to modify the judgment. 5°° The
court rejected the attorneys' argument that the trial court had merely clarified the prior judgment under the authority of section 3.71 and 3.72.501 The
later order affirmatively imposed a new obligation upon the former
spouses.

502

Attorney's Fees. A trial court is empowered to assess attorney's fees against
either spouse in a divorce proceeding under its equitable power to divide the
parties' estate in a manner that is just and right.50 3 Thus, a trial court, in
making an equitable division of the community, may award attorney's fees
taking into account the conditions and needs of the parties as well as the
495. Id.
496. 690 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ).
497. Id. at 346-47.
498. Id. at 348.
499. A trial court has the authority to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or
reform a judgment within the 30-day period after the judgment is signed. TEX. R. Civ. P.
329b(d). Upon expiration of the period the judgment becomes final. See id. 329b().
500. 690 S.W.2d at 347.
501. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.71, 3.72 (Vernon Supp. 1986). These sections are discussed supra note 480.
502. 690 S.W.2d at 347. The court also rejected the attorneys' argument that the trial
court was authorized to enter the later order under § 3.74 of the Family Code. Id. This
section permits a court to enter a money judgment in favor of a party who failed to receive
property or payments of money awarded in the decree. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.74
(Vernon Supp. 1986).
In Starr v. Starr, 690 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ), the court held that an
appeal lies from an order in aid or clarification of a prior order when the order "dispose[s] of
all parties and all issues and leave[s] nothing in the suit for further decision except as necessary
for carrying the decree into effect." Id. at 88. The court reasoned that such an order is a "final
judgment" within the meaning of former article 2249, Act of June 8, 198 1, ch. 291, § 55, 1981
Tex. Gen. Laws 761, 785, repealed by Act of June 16, 1985, ch. 959, § 9, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 7043, 7218 (Vernon), which provided that an appeal or writ of error could be taken from
every final judgment of the district court. Id. at 87-88. In Herbert v. Herbert, 694 S.W.2d 646
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no writ), the Fort Worth court distinguished Starr. The court
pointed out that in Starr the order disposed of all parties and issues before the court, whereas
in the case before it the order dismissing the motion to clarify did so without prejudice to other
claims of the parties. Id. at 650.
503. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63(a) (Vernon Supp. 1986); see also id. § 3.58(c)(4) (permitting an award of attorney's fees in conjunction with a temporary injunction for the preservation of the property and protection of the parties); id. § 3.65 (Vernon 1975) (permitting an
award of costs in a suit for divorce or annulment or to declare a marriage void); id. § 3.77
(Vernon Supp. 1986) (permitting an award of attorney's fees in a Subchapter D enforcement
proceeding).
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surrounding circumstances. 50 4 A claim for such attorney's fees, however,
must be raised in the divorce proceeding so that the issue will not later be
barred as res judicata. 50 5 Hence, in John M. Gillis, P.C. v. Wilbur50 6 the
attorney representing the wife in a divorce failed to plead for attorney's fees
on behalf of his client, and the agreed decree of the parties made no express
reference to attorney's fees. The attorney later brought suit for his fee. The
court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment against the attorney, holding
that the suit was barred. 50 7 The court reasoned that recovery of attorney's
fees was an integral part of a divorce proceeding and that the issue could not
be separated from the other issues arising in a property division.50 8 The
court stated that a contrary holding would require a relitigation of all issues
relating to a fair and equitable division of the property. 50 9 Such a holding
would not promote judicial economy, would encourage vexatious litigation,
and could increase the likelihood of a double recovery. 510 The court, therefore, concluded that the attorney was required to plead for attorney's fees on
behalf of his client against her spouse in the divorce suit or else be barred
from seeking those fees against his client's spouse in a separate suit.5 I '
Other Post-DivorceDisputes. In a post-divorce bankruptcy proceeding 5 12 the
debtor's ex-wife sought to exclude from the debtor's discharge his obligation
to pay joint debts that had been incurred during their marriage. The exhusband had assumed these debts in a property settlement agreement that
was incorporated in the divorce decree. The bankruptcy court considered
whether the debtor's assumption of joint debts constituted a support obligation owed to the ex-wife and hence not dischargeable under section 523(a)(5)
of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 13 The court ascertained that the parties intended
the agreement to be for the ex-wife's support, 51 4 that it was for support, 51 5
and that the amount of support represented by the debtor's assumption of
debts was not excessive. 516 Hence, the court granted the exception from the
504. Murif v. Murif, 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981); Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474,
234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
505. John M. Gillis, P.C. v. Wilbur, 700 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no

writ).
506. 700 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).

507. Id. at 737.
508. Id. at 736.
509. Id. at 737.
510. Id. The policy considerations relied upon by the court were drawn from Gilbert v.
Fireside Enters., Inc., 611 S.W.2d 869, 876 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ).
511. 700 S.W.2d at 737. In Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1985), the Fifth Circuit

court held that former husbands against whom attorney's fees awards had been rendered in
state divorce and custody suits were not permitted to invoke federal district court jurisdiction
to attack the awards on civil rights grounds. Id. at 473. The court noted that the husbands
did not appeal from the judgments entered against them and concluded that a federal district
court does not have jurisdiction of actions which seek review of judgments that should have

been attacked directly in a state court. Id.
512. In re Holland, 48 Bankr. 874 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1984).

513. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(5) (West Pam. Supp. 1986).
514. 48 Bankr. at 877.
515. Id.
516. Id.
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debtor's discharge. 51 7 Though carefully constructed, the argument seems
artificial. The analysis is nevertheless better than that of Fifth Circuit court
in In re Nunnally518 that the divorce court's property division constituted an
"alimony substitute" 519 and that compliance with the order was therefore
520
non-dischargeable.
In In re Teichman 52 1 the Ninth Circuit court arrived at a somewhat more
appealing reason for denying a discharge of the duty to comply with a division of community property on divorce. There the court relied on the principle of trusteeship; in the divorce decree the ex-husband was designated as
trustee of the retirement benefits as received by him for the benefit of his exwife. 522 The court does not explain, however, why the ex-husband in such a
situation is different from any other judgment debtor ordered to make payment to his creditor and whose duty is discharged under the Bankruptcy
Code. Generally, none of the courts' explanations is very satisfactory.
Either the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to bar the discharge of obligations between ex-spouses as adjudicated on divorce or clarified so that the
bar to discharge of support obligations may apply without contrived results.
A common issue after divorce is whether an ex-spouse's beneficial interest
523
in a life insurance policy was affected by the decree. In Parkerv. Parker
the wife was named as primary beneficiary of the husband's life insurance
policy. The divorce court awarded each spouse title to any policy of life
insurance on the life of that spouse. Thereafter the former husband failed to
change the designation of his ex-wife as beneficiary. After the former husband's death suit was brought on behalf of the estate against the ex-wife to
recover the proceeds. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
5 24
the ex-wife.
On appeal by the estate it was argued that the divorce decree disposed of
the rights of the ex-wife under the policy. The court of appeals rejected the
contention, holding that nothing in the divorce decree affected the right of
the decedent to designate whomever he wished as policy beneficiary.5 25 The
court stated that in the absence of specific language dealing with both the
ownership and beneficial interests in a policy, a decree or property settlement agreement which awards only title to a policy to one spouse as separate
property is not to be construed as having terminated any beneficial interest
517. Id.
518. 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975).
519. Id. at 1027.
520. Id; see also In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1982) (payments to the ex-wife
required of the ex-husband under a settlement agreement were in the nature of support); In re
Fox, 5 Bankr. 317, 320-21 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1980) (payments by ex-husband due ex-wife
under promissory note were in the nature of support); Tucker, The Treatment of Spousal and
Support Obligations Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 45 TEX. B.J. 1359, 135964 (1982).
521. 774 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1985).
522. Id. at 1398-1400.
523. 683 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ refd).

524. Id. at 890.
525. Id. (citing Partin v. de Cordova, 464 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971, writ refd)).
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held by the other spouse.5 26 In so holding the court disapproved of McDonald v. McDonald,527 a 1982 decision of the Dallas court in which that court
held that a divorce decree containing provisions similar to the decree at issue
528
divested an ex-spouse of her beneficial interest under a policy.
The San Antonio court also declined to follow McDonald in a similar situation.5 29 In Lewis v. Lewis530 the insurance policy at issue permitted the
owner to change the designated beneficiary at any time, but the ex-husband
53 1
as owner of the policy failed to alter his ex-wife's status before his death.
The court stated that the law indulges a presumption of gift in favor of the
named beneficiary, and some affirmative action other than subjective or ex532
pressed intention is required to give weight to a change of beneficiary.
The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to rebut the presumption of gift, noting that the ex-husband did nothing to change the beneficiary
5 33
despite the fact that under the policy he was entitled to do so at any time.
In Western Fire Insurance Co. v. Pitts534 the ex-husband unsuccessfully
argued that his conveyance of a house to his ex-wife in accordance with a
property settlement agreement did not fall within a fire insurance policy provision which relieved the company of liability upon the change in ownership
of the insured property. The husband argued that the change in ownership
was not of a nature calculated to increase the motive to burn the property or
diminish the motive to guard the property against fire, and hence the conveyance did not affect coverage under the policy. In holding for the insurance company the court stated that parting with the beneficial and legal title
as well as possession of the insured property is of such a nature as to diminish the motive and the opportunity to guard the property against fire and
relieves the insurer from liability under such a change-of-ownership
535
provision.
In Formby v. Bradley536 the husband and wife executed a mutual will that
authorized the surviving spouse to act as independent executor of the decedent's estate. An alternate executrix was named in the event of the spouses'
simultaneous death. The husband died five years after the couple were divorced. On appeal from a denial of the surviving ex-wife's application for
appointment as executrix, the court held that the ex-wife's divorce from the
537
decedent nullified the provisions in the will appointing her as executrix.
Similarly, the court ruled that the alternate executrix was not entitled to
526. Id. (citing Pitts v. Ashcraft, 586 S.W.2d 685, 696 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1979, writ refd n.r.e.)).
527. 632 S.W.2d 636, 638-39 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
528. 683 S.W.2d at 890.
529. Lewis v. Lewis, 693 S.W.2d 672, 675-76 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
530. 693 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
531. Id. at 673, 675.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 675-76. For discussion of a case involving violation of an order restraining the
changing of a beneficiary designation see supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
534. 683 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1984, no writ).
535. Id. at 740-41.
536. 695 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
537. Id. at 783. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69(a) (Vernon 1980).

52
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serve, because simultaneous death, the requisite contingency for her appoint5 38
ment, had not occurred.

538. 695 S.W.2d at 784.

